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TRANSITIONING THE FAMILY BUSINESS
Dwight Drake∗
Abstract: By any measure, family-dominated businesses are the backbone of the
American economy. Although a large majority of family businesses are managed by senior
family members who are older than age 55 and more than 80 percent of such senior family
members claim that they want the business to remain in the family, less than 30 percent of
such businesses have tackled the challenge of developing a plan for transitioning the business
to the next generation. For over 90 percent of such families, this planning challenge is
aggravated by the fact that they have no diversified wealth: the family’s wealth is the
business.
This article examines the technical challenges of designing such a transition plan that
meets the specific objectives of the family, including the family’s tolerance for complexity.
Through the use of a simple case study, this article reviews essential elements that should be
carefully evaluated in the design of any transition plan and explains numerous technical traps
that must be avoided in the plan design. These elements and the related traps include timing
considerations, valuation discounts, marital deduction planning, life insurance structuring,
entity limitation and conversion options, compensation opportunities, and co-shareholder
planning. The comparative benefits and inherent limitations of alternative transition
strategies and business restructuring options are also illustrated, including the complexities
and unique challenges of incorporating advanced estate planning strategies into the plan
design. The article explains and illustrates why certain popular estate tax savings strategies,
including the grantor retained annuity trust, the intentionally defective grantor trust
installment sale, the self-canceling installment note, and the family partnership, often become
problematic, inadvisable, or merely supplemental when the bulk of the family’s wealth is tied
up in a valuable family business. The tax benefits, challenges, and risks of each of these
strategies and others are explained, along with the practical problems that surface with a
family business. The article also explores alternative strategies for anticipating and resolving
conflicting interests between children who work in the business and children who have no
career ties to the business.
The purpose of the article is help professionals better understand the importance,
magnitude, and difficulty of the intergenerational transition challenges of family-dominated
businesses. As the article demonstrates, these are not challenges that can be met with stock
solutions or quick fixes. Each situation requires a custom, strategic plan that, when
implemented wisely over an appropriate period of time, addresses the core objectives of the
family and avoids destructive traps and useless complexities. The ultimate goal is to design a
plan that effectively incorporates a mix of strategies that accomplish the highest priority
objectives at a level of complexity that works for the family.

∗

Copyright 2008 Dwight Drake. All rights reserved. Mr. Drake teaches tax and business courses at
the University of Washington School of Law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION⎯MOUNTAIN OR MARBLES

Mom and Dad have labored a lifetime building a profitable business
that services a market niche and regularly delivers a paycheck to two
hundred hard-working employees. On paper, most would consider them
rich, but they fully appreciate that the bulk of their wealth is tied up in a
business operation that could be derailed by changing market conditions,
a breakthrough technology, a new tenacious competitor, sloppy
management, or a host of other factors. They have witnessed the demise
of other businesses that were all considered “rock solid” at some point in
their existence. The time has come for Mom and Dad to slow down, turn
over the reins, and enjoy their retirement. One child is immersed in the
business, fully prepared and anxious to run the show, and two other
children are off pursing other careers. The family wants a plan that will
ensure the parents’ financial security, treat all children fairly, protect the
business, promote family harmony, and minimize all tax bites. It’s a tall
order.
Family business transition planning is big business. Oft-quoted
statistics say it all. Family-dominated businesses comprise more than 80
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percent of U.S. enterprises, employ more than 50 percent of the nation’s
workforce, and account for the bulk (some estimate as much as 64
percent) of America’s gross domestic product.1 According to a recent
2007 survey of family businesses with annual gross sales of at least $5
million, 60 percent of the majority shareholders in family businesses are
55 or older, and 30 percent are at least age 65.2 And although more than
80 percent of the senior family owners claim that they want the business
to stay in the family, less than 30 percent acknowledge having a
transition plan.3 The result is that most family businesses do remain in
the family, but at a dear cost. Best estimates are that less than 30 percent
of family-dominated businesses survive a second generation, and the
survival rate is even uglier for those businesses that make it to
generation three.4
Strategic transition planning takes time, energy, and a willingness to
grapple with tough family, tax, and financial issues. It cannot make a
weak business strong or provide any guarantees of survival. But it can
trigger an analytical process that prompts a frank assessment of available
options, facilitates better long-term decision making, and saves taxes.
Although many successful family business owners enjoy a net worth
that rivals or exceeds that of other well-heeled clients, the planning
dynamics usually are much different when a family business takes center
stage. For many clients, wealth transition planning focuses on a
potpourri of investment and business assets, packaged into a medley of
partnerships, trusts, limited liability companies (LLCs), and corporate
entities. The challenge is to analyze, reposition where necessary, and
ultimately transition the various marbles in the most tax efficient manner
possible, consistent with the family objectives of the owners. With a
family business, it’s usually not about rearranging marbles; it’s about
trying to move a mountain. In the recent survey referenced above, a
1. See generally M. F. R. Kets de Vries, “The Dynamics of Family Controlled Firms: The Good
News and the Bad News,” ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Winter 1993, at 59-71; P.L. ROSENBLATT
ET AL., THE FAMILY IN BUSINESS (1985); W.G. DYER, CULTURAL CHANGE IN FAMILY FIRMS (1986)
59−71; Arthur Anderson/Mass Mutual, American Family Business Survey, 2002.
2. LAIRD NORTON TYEE, FAMILY TO FAMILY: LAIRD NORTON TYEE FAMILY BUSINESS SURVEY 5
(2007), http://familybusinesssurvey.com/pdfs/LNT_FamilyBusinessSurvey_2007.pdf.
3. Id. The survey also indicated that (1) only 56 percent of the respondents have a written
strategic plan; (2) nearly 64 percent do not require that family members entering the business have
any qualifications or business experience; and (3) 25 percent do not believe that the next generation
is competent to move into leadership roles. Id. at 5.
4. See J.I. WARD, KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY XXIV, 12, 247–50 (1987). This
book suggests the survival rate to generation three is less than 15 percent. Id.
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startling 93 percent of the senior business owners acknowledged that the
business is their primary source of income and security.5 With little or
no diversification, everything gets tougher. Strategies that easily
accommodate marble shifting often become more challenging,
sometimes impossible, when applied to a sliver of the mountain. And,
more often than not, the process is further complicated by strong
emotional ties to the mountain and historical perceptions regarding
essential bonds between the family and the mountain.
The initial challenge in the planning process is the threshold “Keep
vs. Sell” question: Should the business be sold or kept in the family?
Often, the parents automatically assume that the business is going to be
transitioned to the next generation; no thought of selling has seriously
crossed their minds. Some even regard the issue as a taboo subject that is
not to be discussed. The advisor needs to be discerning in such a
situation and assess the risks of saying nothing. A little artful devil’s
advocacy may open minds and jumpstart the analytical process.
Priorities, objectives, biases, family dynamics, and business risk factors
continually evolve and change over time. So too, the answer to the keepsell decision may change with time. The patriarch who would never
consider selling out at age 55 may have a very different perspective by
age 70, particularly if he or she has been subjected to many enlightened
discussions over the years that have focused on a number of key factors
that impact the analysis and the ultimate decision.6
This paper discusses the challenge of developing a transition plan
once the decision has been made to keep the business in the family. The
focus here is not “whether,” but “how.” A simple case study is used to
explain essential plan elements and related planning traps and to
illustrate and contrast strategic options for moving the mountain. The
facts of the case study, summarized in Part II, are common to many
successful family businesses: parents preparing to slow down; a
successful business that represents the bulk of the parents’ estate;
children inside and outside the business; looming estate tax problems;

5. See TYEE, supra note 2.
6. Many factors can and often should impact the analysis, including the family’s emotional ties to
the business, evolving external business risks, children who have committed their careers to the
business, qualified heir challenges, the availability of viable sellout options, and key business
indictors (i.e., strategic- vs. relationship-based, institutionalization potential, margin tolerances,
asset composition, low-tech vs. high-tech, barriers to entry, and capital structure). For a discussion
of the “Keep vs. Sell” decision, see DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD
ENTERPRISES ch. 16 (2006).
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and a compelling need to prepare for the future. Part III of the paper
discusses seven key elements and related traps that should be carefully
considered up front in the design of any transition plan. These are
essential building blocks of the plan. They include: timing transition
decisions to meet the objectives of the specific family; the smart use of
valuation experts and precious valuation discounts; entity limitations and
conversion options; coordinated life insurance planning and related
structural traps that can compromise the entire liquidity plan; challenges
of multiple family owners; marital deduction planning to defer the
ultimate estate tax hit; and compensation planning opportunities. The
discussion includes a review of specific traps that need to be anticipated
and avoided in the plan design.
Part IV discusses, illustrates, and compares strategies for transitioning
stock in a family corporation—gifting options, redemption alternatives,
cross-purchase structures, and business restructuring strategies. This
discussion includes an analysis of the unique challenges that family
businesses often encounter in dealing with popular marble shifting
strategies, such as grantor retained annuity trusts and intentionally
defective grantor trusts. Part V analyzes the challenges of integrating a
family partnership or family LLC into the plan design. The wise use of a
family partnership or LLC may facilitate income shifting, enhanced
valuation discounts, wealth scattering, asset protection, and more. In
recent years, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has stepped up its
efforts to challenge family partnership strategies that push the outer
limits. As a result, existing tax limits and uncertainties must be
anticipated and carefully factored into the plan design. Finally, Part VI
reviews strategies for dealing with the conflicting interests between
children who work in the business and children who have no career ties
to the business. If not properly addressed, these conflicts can lead to bad
business decisions, costly tax consequences, and intolerable family
friction. In some situations, the conflicts can be eliminated by
implementing a strategy that prevents the outside children from ever
acquiring an interest in the business or fairly terminates any such interest
that is acquired. Often, the sheer size of the business precludes this
possibility: joint ownership of the business is unavoidable. The
challenge then shifts to developing a strategy that will provide the inside
children with the control and incentives they require while ensuring that
the liquidity needs and financial interests of the outside children are
satisfied.
The plan design process for each family necessarily must be detail-
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oriented, strategic, and forward-focused. Care must be exercised to avoid
planning traps and the temptation to tack on complicated strategies that
offer little or nothing for the particular family. Each situation is unique
and should be treated as such. There is no slam-dunk solution; all
strategies have limitations and disadvantages that mandate careful
evaluation, and some pose risks or legal uncertainties that many just
cannot stomach. Above all, the specific objectives of the family must
drive the planning process. The objectives, once identified, must be
prioritized to facilitate an effective analysis of the trade-offs and
compromises that inevitably surface in the planning process. The
ultimate goal is to design a plan that effectively accomplishes the highest
priority objectives over a period of time and at a level of complexity that
work for the family.
II.

CASE STUDY: WILSON INCORPORATED

The Wilson family owns a business that is going to be transitioned to
the next generation. The sellout option is off the table. Wilson
Incorporated is a privately owned C corporation that has been in a
specialized distribution business for 26 years. It has an established
reputation with its customers and suppliers. Earl Wilson, age 65, is the
founder and President of the company and historically has been the
principal force behind the company. Earl and his wife Betty, age 60,
own as community property 90 percent of the outstanding common stock
of the company. Betty serves on the board but spends no serious time in
the business. Jeff Wilson, Earl and Betty’s oldest child, owns the
remaining 10 percent of the outstanding stock. Jeff is married and has
been actively involved in the business for years. Technically, Jeff is
considered the second-in-command behind Earl, but all close to the
company recognize that Jeff now is the driving force in the company. In
addition to his strong financial background, Jeff has a proven knack for
sales and marketing, is skilled in dealing with people, and is adored by
key employees and valued customers. Jeff is anxious to take over the
reins and wants to aggressively grow and expand the business. If Jeff’s
involvement in the business was terminated for any reason, the loss to
the business would be substantial.
The company’s growth was dynamic in the earlier years, but recently
the growth has been modest. Earl has been slowing down and has been
reluctant to aggressively reinvest or borrow funds to expand the
operation into new markets. This has been a frustration for Jeff, who
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wants to conquer new frontiers. The business has consistently generated
sufficient profits and cash flow to pay generous salaries and to allow
Earl and Betty to draw approximately $400,000 from the business each
year in compensation payments.
Earl and Betty have two other children—Kathy and Paul. Both are
grown and married, and neither has ever worked in the business. Paul is
a dentist; Kathy used to work in commercial real estate before becoming
a stay-at-home mom. Earl and Betty have four grandchildren and hopes
for one or two more. All family members get along with each other. Earl
is recognized as the family patriarch, although all acknowledge that the
continued success and future of the business rest in the hands of Jeff.
Earl estimates that the business is worth approximately $10 million.
That’s the price that he believes the business could be sold for today.
Earl and Betty’s total estate, inclusive of their share of the business, is
valued at approximately $18 million. Their assets, all community
property, include the building that houses the business. Earl and Betty
own the building outside of the corporation and lease the building to the
company. The building has a value of $3 million.
Earl and Betty have various personal hobbies and interests that they
have neglected in the past to accommodate the demands of the business.
They are anxious to move forward; they are looking forward to
retirement. They would like to develop a plan that will accomplish the
following objectives.
• Earl will phase out of the business over the next year and will
continue to receive payments from the business that will enable Earl and
Betty to ride off into the sunset and enjoy their retirement for the rest of
their lives.
• Jeff will take over the control and management of the business.
Earl wants some ongoing involvement as a hedge against the boredom of
retirement and to ensure that the financial integrity of the business is
protected for the sake of his retirement and Betty’s welfare. Earl will be
freed of all day-to-day responsibilities.
• Jeff will have the freedom to diversify and expand the business.
Jeff would like the plan structured so that the value of all appreciation in
the future will be reflected in his estate and will not continue to build
Earl and Betty’s estates or the estates of other family members,
specifically Kathy and Paul, neither of whom play any role in the
business.
• Earl and Betty want to make sure that, at their passing, each child
receives an equal share of their estates. They are particularly concerned
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about Kathy and Paul, the two children who do not participate in the
business. They appreciate that the business represents the bulk of their
estate. They want Jeff to control and run the business, but they want to
make certain that Kathy and Paul are treated fairly.
• Earl and Betty want to minimize estate taxes, consistent with
their other objectives and their overriding desire to be financially secure
and independent. They never want to be placed in a position of having to
depend on their children, and they always want to know that their estate
is sufficient to finance their lifestyle for the duration. They are willing to
pay some estate taxes for this peace of mind. As a hedge against future
estate taxes, they would like to start transitioning assets to other family
members. They generally understand that, as of right now, their unified
credits7 will shelter $4 million of their estate ($2 million each) from any
federal estate tax exposure and that the excess will be taxed at a rate of
45 percent. Given the value of their estate, the math is frightening. Their
anxiety is only heightened by the reality that Congress will take some
action to revise the estate tax by 2010.
• All family members want to minimize negative income tax
consequences to the fullest extent possible.8
III. ESSENTIAL PLAN ELEMENTS: STARTING POINTS AND
TRAPS
The design of a business transition plan requires that certain key
elements be carefully considered up front to ensure that the financial
interests of the parents are protected, estate taxes are minimized and
deferred, family liquidity needs are satisfied, adverse income tax hits are
eliminated, and sloppy planning does not derail the effort. There are
7. The estate tax unified credit under I.R.C. § 2010 is presently $780,800, an amount sufficient to
shelter $2 million of property (the applicable exclusion amount) from the federal estate tax. I.R.C. §
2010 (2006). The applicable exclusion amount increases to $3.5 million in 2009 and, absent further
action by Congress, goes away in 2010, along with the one-year demise of the estate tax. After
2010, the applicable exclusion amount returns to its pre-2001 level of $1 million along with a full
restoration of the estate tax. Most expect that the one-year disappearing act will never occur because
Congress will be forced to take action before 2010. Depending on their state of residency, the
Wilsons may also have a state inheritance tax burden.
8. The Wilson family’s situation mirrors that of most successful family-owned businesses in
America. According to the 2007 Laird Norton Tyee Family Business Survey, 60 percent of the
responding family companies had a CEO over age 55, 71 percent had no succession plan, 97 percent
had one or more additional family shareholders, 91 percent had at least one additional member
employed by the company, and 74 percent had fewer than five shareholders. See TYEE, supra note
3, at 5-15.
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various planning traps that need to be avoided.
A.

Timing to Fit the Family

Timing is a critical element in the design of any transition plan. The
temperament and anxieties of the parents can impact all timing
decisions. Some are anxious to move at full steam; many need to take it
slow, to walk before they run. A variety of factors can influence
important timing decisions, including the stability of the business, the
parents’ capacity to accept and adapt to change, the demands and
expectations of the children, the strength of the parents’ financial base
outside of the business, the age and health of the parents, and personal
relationships between specific family members. Often the pace of
implementing specific plan elements will accelerate as circumstances
change and as the parents become more comfortable with the transition
process and their new roles.
The planning process usually is helped by focusing on three
timeframes: the period both parents are living, the period following the
death of the first parent, and the period following the death of the
surviving parent. So long as both Earl and Betty are living, top priorities
must include their financial needs and security, their willingness to let go
and walk away from the business, and their appetite for living with any
fallout resulting from the transition of serious wealth and control to their
children. From a tax perspective, all transfers during this timeframe are
going to trigger either a transfer of the parents’ existing stock basis
(often very low)9 or a recognition of taxable income predicated on such
basis.
The death of the first parent often creates more flexibility, particularly
in a community property state such as Washington. A double tax benefit
is realized on the death of the first parent—the income tax basis in all
community property is stepped-up to its fair market value,10 and the
marital deduction may be used to eliminate any estate taxes.11 Any gifts
to other family members during this timeframe now will transfer highbasis assets. Any sales will likely be income tax free. If the deceased
9. For all gifts of property, the donee’s tax basis in the transferred property equals the donor’s
carryover basis plus the amount of any gift taxes paid with respect to the gift, but in no event may
the basis exceed the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift. I.R.C. § 1015(a), (d).
10. Id. § 1014(a), (b)(6). For non-community property, the basis step-up is applicable only to
property acquired from the decedent. Id. § 1014(a).
11. Id. § 2056.
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parent had the strongest ties to the business (as is so often the case),
officially surrendering total control may no longer be an issue. In our
case, for example, Betty presumably would have no interest in being
involved in the business following Earl’s death. Plus, if the life
insurance planning correctly eyeballed the parent most likely to die first
(Earl in our case), the receipt of tax-free life insurance proceeds12 may
substantially reduce or completely eliminate the surviving parent’s
financial dependence on the business. For these reasons, often a
transition plan is designed as a “targeted first death plan” to shift into
high gear the wealth transition process on the death of the first parent.
Of course, the death of the surviving parent triggers the moment of
truth for the two big consequences that have been the focus of the
planning from the outset: (1) the ultimate transition of the business and
the parents’ other assets, and (2) the estate tax bill. As regards the first,
the goal is to ensure that the parents’ objectives for the family are
satisfied without compromising the strength and survival prospects of
the business. The objective for the second is to keep the bill as small as
possible while ensuring a mechanism for payment that won’t unduly
strain the business.
If substantial death taxes are expected on the death of the surviving
parent, it may be very important to structure the timing of various asset
transitions to ensure that at least 35 percent of the surviving parent’s
adjusted taxable estate consists of the company’s stock. Two valuable
benefits may be triggered if this threshold is met. First, a corporate
redemption of the stock held by the estate may qualify for exchange
treatment under section 303 to the extent the redemption proceeds do not
exceed the estate’s liability for death taxes (both federal and state) and
funeral and administrative expenses.13 The result is that the redemption
proceeds are income tax free to the estate because of the basis step-up in
the stock at death. Absent this section 303 benefit, and to the extent any
redemption proceeds exceed the 303 limits, the redemption proceeds
likely will constitute taxable dividends to the estate under section 302

12. Id. § 101(a)(1).
13. Id. § 303(a), (b)(2)(A). The 35-percent threshold may be satisfied by aggregating stock owned
by the decedent’s estate in two or more corporations if at least 20 percent of the outstanding stock
value of each corporation is included in the decedent’s gross estate. Solely for purposes of satisfying
the requisite 20 percent ownership for an included corporation, the interest of the decedent’s
surviving spouse in stock held as community property, joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, and
tenants in common may be considered property included in the decedent’s gross estate. Id.
§ 303(b)(2)(B).
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because all stock owned by beneficiaries of the estate and their family
members will be attributed to the estate.14 When corporate funds are
needed to fund the estate’s tax burden, as is so often the case, this
section 303 benefit becomes very important. Second, if the 35 percent
threshold is met, the estate may elect under section 6166 to fund the
federal estate tax burden over a period of up to 14 years at very
favorable interest rates.15 In those situations where these two tax relief
values are important, the timing of the parent’s stock transition program
prior to death and the value of the parent’s non-stock assets must be
carefully monitored to ensure that the 35 percent threshold will be met at
death.
B.

Valuation: Expert Disappearing Acts

An interest in a business must be valued for tax purposes before it can
be transferred. The standard is “fair market value”⎯the price a willing
buyer would pay a willing seller with neither being under any
compulsion to deal and both having reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts.16 Although the standard has been around forever and the
Service nearly a half century ago provided guidance on how it should be
applied in valuing closely held business interests,17 serious valuation tax
14. The family and estate ownership attribution rules of section 318 usually make it impossible
for the transaction to qualify as a redemption that is not essentially equivalent to a dividend under
302(b)(1), that is a substantially disproportionate redemption under 302(b)(2), or that is a complete
redemption of the estate’s stock under section 302(b)(3). Id. §§ 302(a), 302(b), 318(a)(1), (a)(3)(A).
As a result, any redemption proceeds not protected by section 303 are taxed as dividends under
section 301. Id. §§ 302(d), 301.
15. The interest rate is two percent on the “2 percent portion,” a number adjusted annually, and
45 percent of the normal section underpayment rate for any amounts over the “2 percent portion.”
Id. § 6601(j). For 2008, the “2 percent portion” is $1,280,000. Rev. Proc., 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B.
970. The favorable rate comes with a cost; the interest under section 6601 is not deductible for
estate or income tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 163(k), 2053(c)(1)(D). In Estate of Roski v. Commissioner,
128 T.C. 113 (2007), the Tax Court held that the Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) had abused its
discretion by requiring that all estates who elect the installment option of section 6166 provide a
bond or security in the form of an extended tax lien. Roski, 128 T.C. at 115. In Notice 2007-90,
2007-46 I.R.B. 1003, the Service announced that it had changed its policy and the requirement for
security would be determined on a case-by-case basis.
16. Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1 (2006).
17. In 1959, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, which set forth
guidelines to be used in valuing the stock of a closely held corporation. The ruling did not use a
mathematical formula. It discussed factors that should be considered in arriving at a fair market
value. It recognized that the size of the block of stock was a relevant valuation factor in a closely
held corporation, specifically noting that a minority interest would be more difficult to sell. Years
later in Revenue Ruling 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327, the Service stated that the valuation principles of
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disputes regarding family business interests routinely erupt.
These disputes teach three important lessons. First, secure the services
of a professional appraiser. Valuing a closely held business interest
requires judgment calls that must be made by a professional. Second, get
the best appraiser available. If a dispute breaks out, the quality,
reputation, and competence of the appraiser may be the ultimate
deciding factor. The Tax Court has consistently refused to accept an
appraisal on its face; it has followed a practice of carefully examining
the underlying details and assumptions and the quality of the appraiser’s
analysis.18 A quality appraisal by a competent appraiser may shift the
ultimate burden of proof to the government19 or result in a complete
victory. In a celebrated case decided in 1980,20 the Tax Court refused to
“split the difference” in a valuation dispute, opting instead to declare a
winner based on a comparative assessment of the credibility of the
experts on each side. With full knowledge of this winner-take-all
approach, which has been followed in other key cases,21 an IRS agent
must carefully size up the company’s appraiser in assessing the value of
starting any fight.22 Finally, never get too aggressive on value; it can put
59-60 also would apply to partnership interests.
18. See, e.g., Estate of Kaufman v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1779, 1784 (1999) (declining to
accept petitioner’s valuation of stock and conducting own two-step inquiry into value); Rabenhorst
v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2271, 2276 (1996) (holding that a party’s valuation cannot be
accepted on its face without a consideration of its potential shortcomings).
19. I.R.C. § 7491 (providing that in any court proceeding, the burden of proof with respect to any
factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer shall shift to the Secretary [the
IRS] if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue). In 2007, the Second
Circuit refused to hold for the taxpayer even though credible evidence had been submitted to shift
the burden of proof under section 7491 and the IRS had failed to submit a competent appraisal.
Thompson v. Comm’r, 499 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2007), vacating T.C. Memo 2004-174. The Court
stated, “[Section 7491] does not require the Tax Court to adopt the taxpayer’s valuation, however
erroneous, whenever the Court rejects the Commissioner’s proposed value; the burden of disproving
the taxpayer’s valuation can be satisfied by evidence in the record that impeaches, undermines, or
indicates error in the taxpayer’s valuation.” Id. at 133.
20. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980), acq. 1982-2 C.B. 1.
(“[E]ach of the parties should keep in mind that, in the final analysis, the Court may find the
evidence of valuation by one of the parties sufficiently more convincing than that of the other party,
so that the final result will produce a significant defeat for one or the other, rather than a middle-ofthe-road compromise which we suspect each of the parties expects the Court to reach.”).
21. See, e.g., Spruill Estate v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1197 (1987), Estate of Gallo v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.
470 (1985), Estate of Daily v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. Memo 710 (2001), Estate of Strangi v Comm’r, 115
T.C 478 (2000), Smith v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 745 (1999), Estate of Furman v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2206 (1998); Kohler v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2006-152.
22. Of course, in some cases the court weighs the competing appraisals and makes its own
determination. See, e.g., Estate of Lauder v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 985, 1001 (1994) (court’s
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in play a costly 20 percent penalty (computed on the tax understatement)
if the value used by the client is 65 percent or less than the ultimate
determined value.23 The penalty jumps to 40 percent if the client’s
number falls to 40 percent or less.24
In every situation involving a closely held business, valuation
discounts become the name of the game and play an essential role in the
plan design. In a very real sense, they are the ultimate disappearing act
because big transfer taxes are saved as the values plummet. Usually,
there is a dual focus in planning the valuation discounts. First, all stock
transfers by the parents during life should be structured to qualify for the
largest possible discounts. Discounts reduce the value of the stock
transferred, which in turn reduces gift taxes or permits a greater
leveraging of the gift tax annual exclusion25 and unified credit.26 In our
case, for example, Earl and Betty will be able transition to Jeff, over
time and gift tax free, a larger percentage of the company’s stock if the
value of the shares transferred is heavily discounted. Second, the stock
transition program should be designed to ensure that any stock
remaining in a parent’s estate at death qualifies for the maximum
discounts to minimize any estate tax burden attributable to the stock.
The two most significant discounts associated with an interest in a

value nearly average of values asserted by respective parties); Estate of Fleming v. Comm’r, 74
T.C.M. (CCH) 1049, 1051–55 (1997) (court valued company at $875,000, with Service arguing for
value of $1.1 million and taxpayer asserting value of $604,000); and Estate of Wright v. Comm’r,
73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1863 (1997) (court valued stock at $45 a share, with Service’s appraisal at $50 a
share and taxpayer’s appraisal at $38 a share). In select instances, the Tax Court has rejected the
appraisals submitted by both the Service and the taxpayer on the grounds that the appraisals were
defective or unreliable. See Rabenhorst, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2276; Estate of Kaufman, 77 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1784. When both appraisals are rejected, the Service prevails because the burden of proof
ultimately is on the taxpayer. All the cases confirm the importance of having a quality appraisal
from a reputable firm.
23. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (g).
24. Id.. § 6662(h). Section 6664(c)(1) provides that a taxpayer may avoid the penalties by proving
reasonable cause and good faith. Reliance on a professional appraisal alone will not do the job.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2006). The taxpayer must show that the appraiser was a competent
professional who had sufficient expertise to justify reliance, that the taxpayer provided the appraiser
with all necessary and accurate information, and that the taxpayer relied in good faith on the
appraisal. Decleene v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 457 (2000). See also Thompson v. Comm’r, 499 F.3d 129,
135–36 (2007), vacating T.C. Memo 2004-174 (holding that the penalty is mandatory absent proof
from the taxpayer of good faith reliance).
25. The annual gift tax annual exclusion is presently $12,000. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1). See infra
Section IV.A.
26. The gift tax unified credit is presently $345,800, an amount sufficient to shelter $1 million of
value (the applicable exclusion amount) from gift taxes. I.R.C. § 2505(a). See infra Section IV.A.
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closely held business enterprise are the minority interest (lack of control)
discount and the lack of marketability discount. The minority interest
discount recognizes that a willing buyer will not pay as much for a
minority interest: there is no control. The lack of marketability discount
reflects the reality that a willing buyer will pay less for an interest in a
closely held business if there is no ready market of future buyers for the
interest. Usually both discounts are applied in valuing the transferred
interest.27 The size of the discounts is determined by appraisal. The
average lack of marketability discount applied by the Tax Court over the
last forty years is 24 percent.28 Often the two discounts total 35 to 40
percent.29 These discounts can have a powerful impact in leveraging the
use of annual gift tax exclusions and unified credits to transfer business
interests to family members. In this regard (and this is real good news),
there is no family attribution in applying the discounts.30 The fact that all
the business interests stay in the family will not eliminate or reduce the
discounts. Even the separate community property interests of spouses are
not aggregated for valuation purposes.31 In one case where a 100 percent
business owner transferred his entire ownership to 11 different family
members, the Service recognized that each gift would qualify for
minority interest and lack of marketability discounts.32 Absent such
discounts, each family member would have received a business interest
valued at more than nine percent of the total value (100/11 = something
more than 9). Simply by breaking the ownership interest into minority

27. See generally Dailey v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. 710 (2001); Janda v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. 1100
(2001); Barnes v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. 881 (1998).
28. See Janda, 81 T.C.M. at 1104 (“Mr. Schneider [IRS’s expert appraiser] then listed various
studies made on marketability discounts which are cited by Shannon Pratt in his book Valuing a
Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely-Held Companies (2d ed. 1989). The studies,
which deal with marketability discounts in the context of restricted, unregistered securities
subsequently available in public equity markets, demonstrate mean discounts ranging from 23
percent to 45 percent. Mr. Schneider also cited several U.S. Tax Court cases that established
marketability discounts ranging from 26 percent to 35 percent. Finally, Mr. Schneider stated in his
report that he had consulted a study prepared by Melanie Earles and Edward Miliam which asserted
that marketability discounts allowed by the Court over the past 36 years averaged 24 percent.”).
29. See, e.g., Dailey, 82 T.C.M. at 711 (holding that the applicable discount rate was 40 percent);
Janda, 81 T.C.M. at 1105 (applying a discount rate of 40 percent both for lack of control and
marketability to prediscount fair market value); Barnes, 76 T.C.M. at 889 (applying discount rates
of 40 percent and 45 percent).
30. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 CB 202; Mooneyham v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. 2445, 2447 (1991);
Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78, 107–08 (1986).
31. See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1005 (5th Cir. 1981).
32. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-49-001 (March 11, 1984).
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pieces, the discounts reduced the value of each gift to less than six
percent of the total.33 For tax valuation purposes, the math can be
exciting: 100/11 = something less than 6.
In the planning process, care must be taken to avoid the step
transaction doctrine in structuring transactions to qualify for minority
and lack of marketability discounts. If, for example, Earl and Betty
transfer a minority stock interest in the corporation to Jeff and then have
the corporation redeem the balance of their stock, the step transaction
doctrine will kick in to deny any valuation discounts on the transfer to
Jeff.34 A linking of the two transactions kills the discounts because Jeff
ends up owning a controlling interest in the company.
Care is required whenever voting control is transferred to a family
member. The flipside to the discount game is that a control premium,
often a much as 35 percent, must be considered when voting control is
transferred.35 This results in a higher valuation and more taxes. The math
can be just as weird, but in the wrong direction. In one case, the court
sustained control premiums of 35 percent and 37.5 percent on two
blocks of stock that aggregated 83 percent of the total stock.36 The net
result apparently was a value arguably higher than the total value of all
outstanding stock. When voting control is ultimately transferred and a
premium value kicks in for tax purposes, the planning challenge is to
have the control premium attach to the smallest equity interest possible.
C.

The Entity Form: Nothing Easy

The form of entity usually has a significant impact in the plan design.
Far and away, corporate entities are the preferred choice for family
operating businesses. A 2002 survey of family businesses with average
33. Courts have consistently held that, where a donor makes gifts of multiple shares of the same
security to different donees at the same time, each gift is to be valued separately. See Estate of
Bosca v Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 62 (1998); Mooneyham v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2445
(1991); Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Carr v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 507 (1985); see
also Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 CB 202, revoking Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981 C.B. 187.
34. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 200212006 (March 22, 2002) (“It is well established that where
the steps of a donative transaction have no independent significance, the courts will collapse the
individual steps in determining the substance of the transaction.”); see also Heyen v. United States,
945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991); Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp.2d 700 (W.D. Tex. 1998);
Estate of Bies v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-338; Senda v. Comm’r, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006).
35. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 4.02(e); Treas. Reg. 20.2031-2(f) (2006); Rev. Rul.
89-3, 1989-1 C.B. 278; Estate of Salisbury v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 1441 (1975).
36. Lewis G. Hutchens Non-Marital Trust v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1993-600, 1599, 1612–
14, 1620 (1993).
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annual sales of $36 million confirmed that over 89 percent were
corporations, split relatively equally between C and S status.37 All entity
forms present planning challenges; none is easy. For C corporations, it is
the double tax structure that drives up the cost of redemption and
dividend strategies, the locked-in stock basis that discourages lifetime
gifting and puts a premium on the basis step-up at death, and the
alternative minimum tax threat that complicates corporate funding of life
insurance.38 For S corporations, it is the eligibility requirements that
preclude partnerships, corporations and most trusts39 from owning stock
and prevents the use of any preferred stock. For partnership-taxed
entities, including limited liability companies, it is enhanced self
employment tax burdens,40 the family partnership income tax rules, the

37. Arthur Anderson/Mass Mutual, American Family Business Survey, 2002.
38. For a discussion of the relative tax advantages and disadvantages of each entity form, see
DRAKE, supra note 8, at 33–51. Although the “choice of entity” analysis is heavily tax-driven, there
are many important non-tax factors that can impact the ultimate decision. Some factors, deemed
vitally important in the past, no longer impact the final outcome, and there are new issues that now
must be factored into the mix. In most situations, the analytical process requires the family to
predict and handicap the future and to consider and project earnings, losses, capital expansion
needs, debt levels, the possibility of adding new owners, potential exit strategies, the likelihood of a
sale, the estate planning needs of the owners, and a variety of other factors. The complexity of the
challenge often is enhanced by the need to use multiple entities to accomplish specific family
objectives, to protect assets from liability exposure, to limit or control value growth, to scatter
wealth among family members, to segregate asset-based yields from operational-based risks and
yields, to shift or defer income, to enhance tax benefits from recognized losses, to facilitate exit
strategy planning, to satisfy liquidity needs, or to promote a structured discipline that helps ensure
that all financial bases are covered. It complicates the process, but the benefits usually far outweigh
any burdens of the added complexity.
39. In defining S status eligibility, trusts have received serious Congressional attention over the
years. There has been a constant expansion of the trust eligibility rules. Trusts that are now eligible
to qualify as S corporation shareholders include: (1) voting trusts; (2) grantor trusts; (3)
testamentary trusts that receive S corporation stock via a will (but only for a two-year period of
following the transfer); (4) testamentary trusts that receive S corporation stock via a former grantor
trust (but only for a two-year period following the transfer; (5) a “qualified subchapter S trust”
(QSST), which generally is a trust with only one current income beneficiary who is a U.S. resident
or citizen to whom is distributed all income annually and who that elects to be treated as the owner
of the S corporation stock for tax purposes; and (6) an “electing small business trust” (ESBT),
which is a trust whose beneficiaries are qualifying S corporation shareholders who acquired their
interests in the trust by gift or inheritance, not purchase. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2), (d) (2006). An ESBT
must elect to be treated as an S corporation shareholder, in which case each current beneficiary of
the trust is counted as one shareholder for purposes of the maximum 100 shareholder limitation and
the S corporation income is taxed to the trust at the highest individual marginal rates under the
provision of section 641. Id. § 1361(c)(2), (e)(1)(A).
40. Section 1402(a) of the Code specifically provides that a partner’s distributive share of income
from a partnership constitutes earnings from self-employment. There is a limited statutory exception
for retired partners and a broader exception for limited partners. Id. § 1402(a)(10), (a)(13). Limited
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“real partner” requirement for family transfers, potential gift tax annual
exclusion problems if the operating agreement is too restrictive, and the
threat of a wealth “recycling” claim that may trigger enhanced estate tax
exposure under section 2036.41
Often a desire for a different entity form quickly surfaces in the
planning process. The most common scenario is the family that is fed up
with the double tax burdens of its C corporation and longs for the
flexibility of a pass-through entity. For example, as discussed later, in
Section IV.D, Wilson Incorporated may want to shed its C status in
order to have more restructuring flexibility. Conversion from C status to
partnership tax status via a partnership or a LLC is usually out of the
question; it will trigger a prohibitively expensive double tax on the
liquidation of the C corporation.42 Conversion to S status is the only
partners generally can escape self-employment taxes on partnership income that is not a guaranteed
payment as remuneration for services rendered. Id. § 1402(a)(13). Thus, the key in a partnership
structure is to fit within this limited partnership exception.
As for a limited liability company taxed as a partnership that has no limited partners and no basis
for relying on historical state law distinctions between limited and general partners, the Service’s
first attempt to provide some guidance on the issue came in 1994 when it published its first
Proposed Regulations. They provided that a member of a limited liability company could fit within
the limited partner exception if the member lacked authority to make management decisions
necessary to conduct the business and the LLC could have been formed as a limited partnership in
the same jurisdiction. After public comment, new Proposed Regulations were issued in 1997 that
defined the scope of the limited partnership exception for all entities taxed as a partnership, without
regard to state law characterizations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13,
1997). Under the 1997 Proposed Regulations, an individual would be treated as a limited partner for
purposes of the self-employment tax unless the individual was personally liable for the debts of the
entity by being a partner, had authority to contract on behalf of the entity under applicable law, or
worked in the business for more than 500 hours during the taxable year. Id. at 1704. The 1997
Proposed Regulations also drew criticism because LLC members who had authority to contract on
behalf of the entity could never fit within the limited partner exception. The result was a statutory
moratorium in 1997 on the issuance of any temporary or proposed regulations dealing with the
limited partnership exception. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 935, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 883
(need year). The legislative history confirms that Congress, not the IRS, ultimately must resolve the
issue. The IRS has provided no additional guidance.
For planning purposes, this history provides some guidance. Any general partner under state law
is exposed to the tax. Any limited partner under applicable state law is probably safe. As for LLC
members, any member who can fit within the 1997 Proposed Regulations’ definition is justified in
relying on the statutory limited partner exception. Beyond that definition, it becomes more difficult
and uncertain in evaluating the facts and circumstances of each situation. The risk escalates in direct
proportion to the individual’s authority to act on behalf of the entity and the scope of any services
rendered.
41. I.R.C. § 2036. For a discussion of each of these issues in the context of transition planning,
see infra Section V.B.
42. Id. §§ 331, 336. If, for example, the corporation is subject to a 34 percent marginal tax rate
and the shareholder pays a 15 percent capital gains rate, the combined tax burden on any distributed
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viable option, but it is not free of hassles.
A conversion from C status to S status creates potential tax traps that
need to be carefully evaluated and monitored. If the company values its
inventory under the last-in-first-out (LIFO) method, conversion to S
status will trigger a recapture of the LIFO recapture amount, to be
funded over a four-year period.43 Accumulated earnings and profits from
the company’s prior C period will trigger a taxable dividend to the
shareholders if shareholder distributions from the S corporation exceed
earnings during the S period.44 A corporate level built-in gains tax will
be triggered if assets owned by the corporation at time of conversion are
sold within the ten-year period following the conversion.45 This will
require a careful monitoring of any asset sales during the ten-year
window. Finally, if the net passive income received by the S corporation
exceeds 25 percent of its receipts during a period that it has undistributed
earnings and profits from its C existence, a corporate level tax will be
triggered and the S status could be put in jeopardy if the condition
persists.46
In many family situations, conversion from C to S status will help the
transition planning process by opening up more restructuring options.
appreciation in the liquidation will be 43.9 percent [34 + (15 x (1-34))].
43. Id. § 1363(d). The LIFO recapture amount is the excess of what the inventory value would be
under the first-in-first-out (FIFO) method over the LIFO valuation method used by the corporation.
Id. § 1363(d)(3). The size of the recapture amount is a function of the historical increases in
inventory costs and how fast the inventory turns.
44. Id. § 1368(c)(2). The taxable dividend exposure is limited by the amount of the corporation’s
earnings and profits from its C corporation existence and ends once the earnings and profits have
been distributed. An S corporation, with the consent of all shareholders, may elect to accelerate such
dividends by treating all distributions as earnings and profits distributions. Id. § 1368(e)(3). Such an
acceleration may facilitate the use of the favorable 15 percent tax rate on dividends before its
scheduled expiration in 2010.
45. See generally id. § 1374. The tax is imposed at the highest corporate tax rate (presently 35
percent) on the lesser of (1) the gain recognized on the sale or (2) the asset’s built-in gain at the time
of the S conversion. This corporate level tax is in addition to the tax that the shareholder bears as a
result of the S corporation’s gain being passed through and taxed to the shareholder. The only relief
to this forced double tax is that the tax paid by the corporation is treated as a loss to the shareholders
in the same year.
46. See generally id. §§ 1375, 1362(d)(3). For purposes of these provisions, the term “passive
investment income” includes interest, dividends, royalties, and rents. Id. § 1362(d)(3)(C). If the 25
percent threshold is met, the highest corporate tax rate (presently 35 percent) applies to the excess of
the net passive income over 25 percent of the total receipts. The actual calculation of the tax is
complicated by factoring in any expenses directly connected to the passive income. Plus, an S
corporation can lose its S status⎯a disaster⎯if it allows the condition to exist for three consecutive
years. If the S election is lost, relief may be possible by timely showing that the circumstances
resulting in the termination were inadvertent. Id. § 1362(f).
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The potential tax traps described above, all of which are triggered by the
conversion, prompt some to take the conversion option off the table.
This is usually ill-advised. These traps should be viewed as serious
nuisances that are capable of being monitored and often can be mitigated
or eliminated entirely. Seldom will they justify rejecting a conversion
that will provide needed planning flexibility in the given situation.
D.

Life Insurance: Structural Blunders

The stock transition plan must be coordinated with the parents’ life
insurance planning. In many family businesses, life insurance provides
essential liquidity to pay the death taxes, to cover the cash needs of the
family, and to free the business of cash burdens that otherwise might
adversely impact operations or threaten its survival.47 A central
challenge in the planning process is to ensure that the life insurance
proceeds are not taxed in the parents’ estates. Usually, but not always,
the best strategy to accomplish this essential tax objective is to park the
ownership of the policy in an irrevocable trust that has no legal
connection to the corporation. However, in many situations, the cashflow pressures of funding the premiums and the interests of other
shareholders result in the policy having close ties to the business. In
every such situation, the policy ownership and beneficiary decisions
need to be carefully evaluated up front to eliminate tax problems and
unintended consequences. This usually requires some basic “what if”
analysis to avoid blunders that can undermine the entire effort. The
following are key traps to avoid.
1.

Constructive Premium Dividend Trap

To illustrate how this trap surfaces, assume in our case study that Earl
and Betty, owners of 90 percent of the corporation’s stock, enter into a
cross-purchase buy-sell agreement48 with Jeff, the owner of the
remaining 10 percent. To ensure funding of the cross-purchase on the
death of a shareholder, the parties agree that corporate resources will be
47. In a 2002 survey of successful family business owners (average annual sales of $36.5
million), nearly one-half (47.7%) of the responding owners listed life insurance as their primary
source of funds to pay death taxes and listed life insurance trusts as the most frequently used estate
planning technique. Arthur Anderson/Mass Mutual, American Family Business Survey, 2002.
48. A cross-purchase buy-sell agreement is an agreement among the shareholders of a corporation
in which the shareholders contractually agree to purchase the stock of a co-shareholder under
defined conditions and on specific terms that are set forth in the agreement.
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used to fund life insurance policies on Earl and Jeff. Jeff, the minority
shareholder, owns a $9 million policy on Earl’s life to cover the 90
percent of the stock owned by Earl and Betty, and Earl and Betty own a
$1 million policy on Jeff’s life to cover the stock owned by Jeff. Absent
careful planning, it is likely that the payments made by the corporation
to fund the premiums on these policies owned by the shareholders will
be treated as distributions with respect to stock for tax purposes. In a C
corporation, these payments will trigger constructive taxable
dividends—an added tax burden.49 In an S corporation, it is possible that
the arrangement (which produces larger distributions for the benefit of
the minority shareholder Jeff) could be considered a second class of
stock that would kill the S election—a bombshell.50 Cash pressures often
require that corporate resources be used to fund premiums on policies
that are going to be owned by other parties, including life insurance
trusts. Whenever this common condition exists, great care must be
exercised to structure compensation and other arrangements that account
for such premium payments in the most tax efficient manner possible. It
adds complexity, but the complexity is essential in this situation.
2.

The Lopsided Cross-Purchase Disaster

Assume the same cross-purchase scenario as described above, except
the parties have eliminated the constructive dividend threat by
implementing a compensation structure to account for the premium
payments. Earl then dies, and Jeff uses the tax-free $9 million death
benefit that he receives to acquire Earl and Betty’s stock. Soon after
Jeff’s acquisition of the stock, he sells the company for its $10 million
value. The income tax hit to Jeff on the sale is peanuts because of the
high stock basis resulting from his purchase of the stock. Jeff walks from
the sale with roughly $9.9 million after tax.51 In contrast, Earl and
Betty’s heirs, including Jeff, collectively net less than $5 million from
Earl and Betty’s 90 percent stock interest after the estate tax hit on the
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1316, 1322–24 (1980); Ashby v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 409,
417 (1968); Hood v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 172, 179–81 (2000); Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42.
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(i)(vi) ex. 6 (CCH 2007). If there is a binding agreement to
use corporate funds to pay the premiums, the risk of a second class of stock finding is very high and
the S status may be in jeopardy. See id. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(vi) ex. 6. See also Minton v. Comm’r, 2007
T.C.M. (RIA) 2011, 2016 (2007) (“[T]he corporation ceases to qualify as an S corporation . . . upon
the creation of a second class of stock.”).
51. Jeff’s only income tax cost on the sale would be the capital gains hit on the gain recognized
on the 10 percent stock interest that he has historically owned.
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$9 million purchase price is absorbed.52 Jeff, having shed the business,
nets a monstrous benefit from the company compared to his siblings, a
result Earl and Betty may have never intended. The simple lesson is to
carefully factor in family dynamics before ever adopting a buy-sell or
insurance structure commonly used by unrelated parties. In this
situation, fundamental family objectives likely would have been
immeasurably improved by having a life insurance trust own the policy
on Earl’s life under a structure that ensured freedom from income,
estate, and generation-skipping tax consequences.
3.

The Majority Shareholder Trap

Assume in the prior example that, to facilitate corporate funding of
the premiums on the policy that insures Earl’s life, the corporation
actually owns the policy. Thus, the corporation just pays premiums on
an asset that it owns. The corporation, as the policy owner, then names
Jeff as the beneficiary. If Earl owns more than 50 percent of the
corporation’s outstanding voting stock on his death, the entire death
benefit paid under the policy will be taxed in his estate because he will
be deemed to have retained incidents of ownership in the policy by
virtue of his majority stock position in the company.53 Earl’s gross
taxable estate will have mushroomed even though the death benefit is
paid to Jeff. This trap kicks in when the death benefit of a corporateowned policy insuring the life of a majority stockholder is paid to a party
other than the corporation.54 The trap can be avoided by naming the
policy’s corporate owner as the policy’s sole beneficiary or by making
sure that the insured does not own a majority of the corporation’s
outstanding voting stock. As regards the stock ownership threshold, the
good news in a community property state is that, for purposes of this
trap, an insured will not be deemed to own his or her spouse’s
community property interest in any stock.55

52. The calculation assumes that the present 45 percent marginal federal estate rate is in effect.
[$9 million x (1-.45) = $4.95 million].
53. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6).
54. Id.
55. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-46-004 (Aug. 8, 1997) (ruling that the majority voting stock
requirement was not met when the decedent and his spouse each owned a 36 percent community
property interest in the corporation’s stock).
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4.

Corporate Ownership Traps

As previously stated, if the corporation is the named beneficiary on a
corporate-owned policy that insures the life of the majority stockholder,
the death benefit paid to the corporation on the death of the majority
shareholder will not be included in the shareholder’s estate.56 But, that is
not the end of the story. The corporation’s ownership of the policy may
trigger other burdens. First, the family usually needs to get the insurance
proceeds out of the corporation to satisfy the cash objectives of the
family. This often creates unpleasant dividend income tax burdens when
a C corporation is involved. The same burdens exist, but not to the same
degree, for an S corporation that has undistributed earnings and profits
from a prior C corporation existence.57 Second, the death benefit may
trigger an alternative minimum tax (“AMT”)58 for the corporation
because the amount by which the death benefit exceeds the corporation’s
basis in the policy will add to the corporation’s adjusted current earning
for AMT purposes.59 Finally, although the death benefit of an insurance
56. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2), (6).
57. The tax-free receipt of the life insurance proceeds by the S corporation does not increase the
accumulated adjustment account of the S corporation. See I.R.C. §§ 101(a)(1), 1368(e)(1)(A) (West
2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2. Any distributions by the S corporation in excess of its accumulated
adjustment account (a likely result if life insurance proceeds are distributed) will trigger a taxable
dividend to the shareholders to the extent the S corporation has any undistributed earnings and
profits from its C corporation existence. See I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2).
58. The corporate alternative minimum tax is structured to ensure that a C corporation that claims
various tax benefits under the “regular tax” will pay a minimum tax amount. The corporate AMT is
20 percent of the amount by which the corporation’s alternative minimum taxable income exceeds
the $40,000 exemption amount, reduced by the corporation’s alternative minimum foreign tax credit
for the year. See I.R.C. §§ 55(a), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), (c), (d)(2), 56.
59. See id. § 55(g). Not all C corporations are subject to an alternative minimum tax. There are
blanket exceptions for a C corporation’s first year of operation, any C corporation with average
annual gross receipts of less than $5 million during its first three years, and any C corporation with
average annual gross receipts of less than $7.5 million during any three-year period thereafter. Id.
§ 55(e). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 added section 101(j), which subjects a portion of the
proceeds paid on certain employer-owned life insurance polices to income taxation. If section 101(j)
is applicable to a policy, the excess of the death benefit received over the total premiums and other
amounts paid for the policy will be taxable income. The section applies to an “employer-owned life
insurance contract,” which is generally defined to include any policy owned by and for the benefit
of a business that insures the life of a person who was an employee of the business at the time the
policy was issued. There are substantial exceptions that, as a practical matter, will render the
provision irrelevant in most business and executive planning situations. The exceptions preserve
tax-free treatment if the insured was an employee during the 12-month period before the insured’s
death, if the insured was a director or highly compensated employee of the business, if the proceeds
were payable to the insured’s estate, members of the insured’s family or a trust established for their
benefit, or if the proceeds were used to acquire an equity interest in the business from the insured’s
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policy owned by and payable to a corporation will not be included in the
taxable estate of the shareholder, the value of the stock in the insured’s
taxable estate may be adversely impacted by the corporation’s receipt of
the insurance proceeds. Depending on the existence of a buy-sell
agreement, its compliance with the section 2703 requirements,60 and the
underlying purpose of the corporation’s ownership of the insurance, the
valuation impact will vary, but in most cases the proceeds will not have
a dollar-for-dollar impact.61
5.

Transfer-for-Value Trap

Unraveling a corporate ownership life insurance structure may trigger
a transfer-for-value trap that will destroy the income tax-free receipt of
the death benefit. Assume, in our case, that the corporation is both the
owner and the beneficiary of the policy insuring Earl’s life and that the
family later determines that the AMT impacts and the tax problems
created by having the death benefit paid to the corporation are
intolerable. To remedy the situation, the corporation transfers ownership
of the policy to Jeff as additional compensation or as part of a dividend
estate or members of the insured’s family. Id. §§ 101(j)(2), 414(q), 105(h)(5). The one potential trap
is that an exception will apply only if the notice and consent requirements of the new provision are
met before the policy is issued. These requirements mandate that, before the policy is issued, the
company must provide a written notice to the insured of the company’s intention to own; be the
beneficiary of the policy; the insured must consent in writing to being the insured on a policy that
may continue after the insured’s termination of employment. Id. §§ 101(j)(2), 101(j)(4).
60. Id. § 2703. See related discussion in infra Section III.E.1.
61. A leading case in dealing with the valuation issue in the context of key person insurance is
Estate of Huntsman.v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976), acq., 1977-2 C.B. 1. In Huntsman, the
IRS claimed that all the proceeds of the insurance policies received by the corporation on the death
of the decedent would have to be added in determining the value of the stock in the decedent’s
estate. Id. at 869–70. In rejecting the IRS approach, the Tax Court held that the insurance proceeds
should be given “consideration” in the valuation process. Id. at 874. Essentially, the court
determined that, to the extent the valuation of the business was based upon the net assets of the
business, the insurance proceeds should be included in the asset value calculation. Id. at 874–75.
However, the court reasoned that, to the extent the stock valuation was based on a price/earnings
multiple, the insurance proceeds may strengthen the cash position of the company, which in turn
may impact the determination, but it would not be a dollar-for-dollar impact. Id. at 878. The most
interesting aspect of the Huntsman case is the final result that surfaced after all the calculations were
completed. In that case, the earnings multiple basis of valuation was weighted three times heavier
than the net asset basis of valuation. Id. In addition, the court discounted the value of the decedent’s
stock to reflect the loss of the decedent’s value to the corporation. Id. at 879. The bottom line was
that, for the first corporation in the case, the ultimate value was increased approximately twentyfour cents for each dollar of insurance received. See id. For the second corporation in the case, the
ultimate valuation was increased approximately thirty-three cents for each dollar of insurance
received. See id.
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distribution. This shift in ownership will trigger the transfer-for-value
rule62 under section 101(a)(2), effectively destroying Jeff’s capacity to
receive the death benefit income tax free. It’s a disaster. Exceptions to
this harsh result exist for transfers to the insured, gratuitous transfers
from the insured, transfers to (but not from) a corporation in which the
insured is a shareholder or officer, and transfers among partners.63 The
lesson is to carefully set the best insurance structure up front. Changes
can be costly and sometimes tax prohibitive.
As stated above, often the smartest life insurance strategy is to use an
irrevocable trust that has no legal ties to the corporation. The trust is
both the owner and the beneficiary of the policy. The identity and rights
of the trust beneficiaries need to be carefully coordinated with the entire
transition plan to protect the respective interests of the inside and outside
children. This structure avoids corporate ownership traps and tax
burdens, ensures that a structure commonly used by unrelated business
parties does not become the default option for the family, and, if done
right, protects the death benefit from estate tax exposure.64 The premium
funding burden might still exist; careful planning may be necessary to
get funds out of the corporation and into the trust to cover the premiums
on the policy. Often, this will require compensation payments or S
corporation distributions to the parents, followed by annual gifts to the
trust that are carefully structured to be gift-tax protected by the parents’
annual exclusions or unified credits.65

62. Amounts received under a life insurance contract generally are not taxable as income under
section 101(a)(1). An exception to this broad income exclusion, known as the transfer-for-value
rule, is triggered whenever a life insurance contract is transferred for valuable consideration. When
such a transfer occurs, the portion of the proceeds excluded from the income tax may not exceed the
sum of such valuable consideration and any premiums paid by the transferee. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2).
63. Id. § 101(a)(2).
64. Life insurance proceeds will not be included in the insured’s taxable estate if the insured
owned no incidents of ownership in the policy at death and owned no such incidents during the
three-year period preceding death. Id. §§ 2035(a)(2), 2042.
65. The challenge in many plans is to build provisions into the trust that will enable the gifts that
are made to fund the premium burden to qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion. In almost all
situations, this is done by including special Crummey withdrawal rights in the trust that convert a
trust beneficiary’s future interest in the gifts to a present interest, which in turn qualify the gifts for
the annual gift tax exclusion. This Crummey withdrawal right, named after the case that made it
famous, Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), is a special provision in the trust
that gives each beneficiary, for a limited period of time, the right to withdraw a portion of any gift
made to the trust. The existence of this right, even if it is not exercised and is allowed to “lapse,”
will convert a future trust interest to a present trust interest so that the contribution will qualify for
the annual gift tax exclusion under section 2503(b)(1). See Crummey, 397 F.2d at 86, 88.
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Multiple Family Owners: More is Tougher

The planning takes on a new dimension as multiple family members
and trusts begin acquiring stock in the company. The rights and interests
of the various shareholders need to be clarified by agreement to keep
expectations in line, protect the business, and mitigate the risk of ugly
confrontations. Plus, care must be exercised to avoid certain tax traps
that can surface as the parents implement their stock transition plan.
A buy-sell agreement between all the shareholders becomes essential
once the transition process begins. The agreement should anticipate how
and when the balance of the parents’ stock in the company will be
transitioned. Often special provisions tailored to the unique needs of the
parents and not applicable to the stock held by the children will be
required. The agreement also must address the stock held by the children
to ensure that all stock stays in the family and that a child has a fair exit
sellout option if the child dies or needs to cash-in because of bankruptcy,
divorce, disability, sibling discord, or some other compelling
circumstance. This family buy-sell agreement should be carefully crafted
to meet the specific needs of those family members who own, or in the
future may own, stock in the company.
1.

Buy-Sell Valuation Trap

The buy-sell valuation trap surfaces when the stock owned by a
deceased family member is sold pursuant to the terms of a buy-sell
agreement, but the price paid under the agreement is less than the value
of the sold stock for estate tax purposes. The decedent’s estate ends up
paying estate taxes on a value that was never realized.
The key to avoiding this trap is to structure the buy-sell agreement so
that it fixes the value of the company’s stock for federal estate tax
purposes. The Service perceives buy-sell agreements as potential tools to
abuse the valuation process, particularly in family situations.66 For this
reason, section 2703 was added to the Code in 1990 to specify certain
criteria that must be satisfied in order for a buy-sell agreement price to
control for estate tax valuation purposes. Section 2703(b) imposes a
three-part test:
(1) The agreement must be a bona fide business arrangement;
66. See, e.g., St. Louis Bank v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982); Estate of Lauder v.
Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1643 (1992); Carpenter v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1274 (1992);
Seltzer v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1250 (1985).
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(2) The agreement must not be a device to transfer property to
members of the decedent’s family for less than full value and
adequate consideration in money or money’s worth; and
(3) The terms of the agreement must be comparable to similar
arrangements entered into by persons in an arm’s-length
transaction.67
Each of the three requirements must be satisfied, along with the
requirements imposed by regulations that existed before the adoption of
section 2703.68 In most cases, the third requirement of section 2703 will
prove to be the most difficult. The comparable arm’s-length
determination is made at the time the agreement is entered into, not
when the rights under the agreement are exercised.69 This third
requirement will be satisfied if the agreement is comparable to the
general practice of unrelated parties under negotiated agreements in the
same industry.70 An effort must be made to determine what others in the
same industry are doing. If multiple valuation methods are used in the
industry, the requirement can be satisfied by showing that the valuation
mechanism in the agreement is comparable to one of the commonly used
methods.71 If there are no industry standards because of the unique
nature of the business, standards for similar types of businesses may be
used to establish the arm’s-length terms of the agreement.72
Because section 2703 is targeted at abuses among family members,
the regulations to section 2703 provide an exception in those situations
where over fifty percent of the equity ownership interests in the business

67. I.R.C. § 2703(b).
68. Three criteria established under applicable law before the adoption of section 2703 must be
satisfied: (1) the price must be specified or readily ascertainable pursuant to terms of the agreement
and the value must have been reasonable when entered into; (2) the decedent’s estate must be
obligated to sell at death at the specified price; and (3) the decedent must have been restricted from
selling or transferring the interest during life. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (2007). This third
condition is not satisfied if the decedent had a right to transfer the interest by gift during life to a
person who was not subject to the same restrictions. Id. As a minimum, this provision generally
requires that the interest be subject to a right of first refusal at the fixed or determinable price under
the agreement during the decedent’s life. Id.
69. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(i); see also Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, 2006 T.C.M. (RIA) 539, 539
(2006) (holding that evidence of price in other arm’s-length transactions may be used to sustain the
burden of proof).
70. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(i). It is not necessary that the provisions parallel the terms of
any particular agreement. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(ii).
71. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(ii).
72. Id.
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are owned by non-family members. 73 In order for the exception to apply,
the equity interests owned by the unrelated parties must be subject to the
same restrictions and limitations as those applicable to the transferor.74 If
this fifty-percent test and the three pre-section 2703 basic structural
requirements are met,75 the requirements of section 2703 are deemed
satisfied and the value determined pursuant to the agreement will govern
for estate tax purposes.
2.

Preferred Stock Traps

In many situations, the parent’s desire to use preferred stock to
facilitate the stock transition process to other family members. Extreme
caution is required whenever preferred equity interests are considered in
the plan design. The issuance of preferred stock will kill an S election,
and the existence of preferred stock may make a future S election
impossible if the holder of the stock is unwilling to surrender his or her
preferred rights.76 Of far greater concern is section 2701, the provision
that assigns a zero value to a retained preferred interest that does not
contain a “qualified payment” right when there is a transfer of a common
equity interest to a family member.77 Assume, for example, that a C
corporation has outstanding common stock valued at $3 million and noncumulative preferred stock valued at $2 million, all owned by the parent.
If the parent sold the common stock to an unrelated party for $3 million,
the parent would simply report capital gain income on the excess of the
$3 million sale price over the parent’s tax basis in the sold stock. If,
however, the parent sold the common stock to a child for $3 million, the
parent also would be deemed to have made a $2 million taxable gift to
the child. This extreme result is mandated by section 2701, which
requires that the preferred stock retained by the parent be valued at zero
and the common stock sold to the child be assigned a value of $5
73. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(3). Family members include the transferor’s spouse, any ancestor of the
transferor or the transferor’s spouse, any spouse of any such ancestor, and any lineal descendant of
the parents of the transferor or the transferor’s spouse (but not spouses of such descendants). Id.
§§ 25.2701-2(b)(5), 25.2703-1(b)(3). Broad entity attribution rules are used to determine ownership,
with an interest being deemed a family interest if it is attributed to both a family and non-family
member. Id. §§ 25.2701-6(a)(2)-(4), 25.2703-1(b)(3).
74. Id. § 25.2703-1(b)(3).
75. For a summary of the three criteria established under applicable law before the adoption of
section 2703, see supra note 68; see also Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h).
76. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (2006).
77. Id. § 2701(a)(3)(A).
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million. And the parent still owns the preferred! This taxable gift can be
avoided only if the parties agree that qualified dividend payments
henceforth will be made to the parent on a regular basis and actually
make such payments.78 In that event, the retained preferred stock would
be valued based on the size of the qualified payments, and the gift would
be reduced accordingly. But such qualified payments can be
burdensome; they trigger double-taxed dividend income to the parent,
drain cash from the corporation, and pump up the parent’s taxable estate.
The lesson is to keep a very close eye on section 2701 whenever
preferred equity interests are part of the mix.
3.

Voting Stock Trap

This trap is triggered when a parent transfers stock in a controlled
corporation and, through some means, “directly or indirectly” retains the
right to vote the stock. When this condition exists, section 2036(b) kicks
in and the stock is brought back into the parent’s estate for estate tax
purposes. The transfer will have done nothing to reduce the parent’s
future estate tax burden. A corporation will be considered a “controlled
corporation” if at any time after the transfer and within three years of
death, the transferring parent owned, or is deemed to have owned under
the broad family and entity attribution rules of section 318,79 at least 20
percent of the total combined voting power of all stock80—a condition
that is easily satisfied by nearly every family corporation. The “directly
or indirectly” language extends the reach of the section 2036(b) trap to
many situations, including those where the parent votes transferred stock
held in trust, where the parent is a general partner of a partnership that
owns the transferred stock, and where the parent, through an express or
implied agreement, retains the right to reacquire voting authority or has
the right to influence or designate how the stock will be voted.81 The
safest way to avoid this trap is to transfer nonvoting stock, an option
available to both C and S family corporations.82 Plus, in addition to
avoiding section 2036(b) threats, use of nonvoting stock usually will

78. Id. § 2701(a)(3), (c)(3).
79. See id. § 318.
80. Id. § 2036(b)(2).
81. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999 (June 7, 1999) (transferor general partner of
partnership); Rev. Rul. 80-346, 1980-2 C.B. 271 (oral agreement with transferor).
82. Use of nonvoting stock does not trigger the trap. See Rev. Rul. 81-15, 1981-1 C.B. 458; Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-2(a), 49 Fed. Reg. 35143 (Aug. 3, 1983).
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buttress the application of a lack of control valuation discount. The need
for nonvoting stock often requires a simple tax-free recapitalization to
convert outstanding voting common stock to both voting and nonvoting
stock.
The transition planning process should anticipate and avoid problems
with the family buy-sell agreement and the preferred stock and voting
stock traps. As other family members begin acquiring stock, the process
also should address the expectations of the new shareholders and their
perceptions of their new wealth. They are no longer just family
members; they are now owners. Usually there is a need for education
and dialogue on a broad range of basic issues, including limitations
imposed by the buy-sell agreement, the rationale for using nonvoting
stock, cash flow expectations, future transition plans, and more. The goal
is to keep all shareholders informed and to ensure that expectations are
in line with reality.
F.

Marital Deduction Traps

Smart use of the marital deduction is essential in most plans. It is the
tool that eliminates any estate tax bite on the death of the first spouse,
deferring all taxes until the survivor’s death. Although rationales are
sometimes spouted for paying some taxes at the first death, they are
always based on problematic assumptions and ignore the simple reality
that most clients, particularly business owners, have no stomach for
paying taxes any sooner than absolutely necessary. In most situations,
the game plan is to transfer to a qualified terminable interest property
(QTIP) trust the smallest portion of the deceased spouse’s estate
necessary to eliminate all taxes in the estate.83 To qualify for the marital
deduction, the QTIP must mandate that, during the life of the surviving
spouse, all QTIP income will be currently paid to the surviving spouse
and no person other than the surviving spouse may receive property
distributions from the trust.84 A closely held business interest that
comprises the bulk of the estate can trigger problems with a QTIP.
83. Although both a direct bequest to the surviving spouse and a bequest to a QTIP trust may
qualify for the marital deduction and eliminate any estate tax liability on the death of the first
spouse, the QTIP offers advantages that often make it the preferred option. With a QTIP, the first
spouse to die can specify and limit the surviving spouse’s access to the principal (not income) of the
trust, can designate how the trust remainder will be distributed on the death of the surviving spouse,
can help protect the trust estate against creditor claims of the trust beneficiaries, and can help
preserve valuable discounts.
84. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).
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1.

The Minority Discount QTIP Trap

The Minority Discount QTIP trap surfaces when a controlling interest
in the business is included in the estate of the first spouse to die, but only
a minority interest in the business is used to fund the QTIP. The same
specific shares in the estate are given a high value for gross estate
valuation purposes and a lower discounted minority interest value for
marital deduction purposes. This whipsawing nets a marital deduction
that is too low, and the estate of the first spouse to die ends up with an
unanticipated estate tax liability.85 Plus, if the underfunded marital
deduction resulted in an overfunding of a credit shelter trust—a likely
result in many cases—the surviving spouse may be deemed to have
made a taxable gift to the credit shelter trust.86 And, there is more. If the
surviving spouse has an income interest in the credit shelter trust, the
property that constituted the constructive gift likely will be pulled back
into the taxable estate of the surviving spouse at death under section
2036.87 The key to avoiding all this mess is to make certain that if the
estate owns a controlling stock interest in the business, the QTIP is
funded with other estate assets or with stock that represents a controlling
interest.
The trap also can surface when a controlling stock interest is
designated to pass directly to the surviving spouse under the will or
living trust of the first spouse to die, but the surviving spouse disclaims a
portion of the bequest88 and, as a result, ends up receiving a minority
stock interest. In calculating the estate tax on the first death, the size of
the marital deduction will be predicated on the discounted minority
valuation of the stock, triggered by the surviving spouse’s disclaimer.89
Again, the same shares are given a higher valuation for gross estate
inclusion purposes than for marital deduction purposes.
There is a flipside to this trap that may produce a positive result in the
right situation. If the QTIP is funded with a controlling interest in the

85. See Estate of DiSanto v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1226–27 (1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 90-50-004 (Aug. 31, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-47-065 (July 12, 1991).
86. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-16-003 (Dec. 27, 1990).
87. See I.R.C. § 2036(a); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-16-003 (Dec. 27, 1990).
88. Such a disclaimer is effective for transfer tax purposes if (1) it is in writing and delivered
within 9 months of the date the property interest is created, (2) the disclaiming party has not
accepted the property interest or any related benefits, and (3) the property interest passes without
any direction by the disclaiming party. I.R.C. § 2518.
89. See Estate of DiSanto v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1226–27 (1999).
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stock and the credit shelter trust is funded with a minority stock interest,
the stock passing to the QTIP may qualify for a control premium for
marital deduction valuation purposes. The end result is that fewer shares
may need to pass to the QTIP to secure the needed martial deduction,
leaving more shares for the credit shelter trust.90
2.

The Buy-Sell QTIP Trap

The buy-sell QTIP trap may be triggered when the QTIP is funded
with corporate stock that is subject to a buy-sell agreement. If the
agreement gives other family members the right to buy the stock
pursuant to a price established under the agreement and the requirements
of section 2703 are not satisfied,91 the price paid for the stock under the
agreement will not be controlling for estate tax purposes. As a result, the
value of the stock for estate tax purposes, as ultimately determined, may
be greater than the price paid under the buy-sell agreement. In that event,
the buyers of the stock may be deemed to have received an economic
benefit from the QTIP during the life of the surviving spouse by virtue
of their right to buy the stock for less than full consideration, and the
entire QTIP marital deduction may be blown.92 The key to avoiding this
trap is to ensure compliance with the section 2703 requirements or to
make certain that any stock passing to the QTIP is not subject to a buysell agreement.
3.

The Non-QTIP Trap

Assume in our case study that, at Earl’s death, his estate owns 45
percent of the stock and Betty owns 45 percent of the stock. The 45
percent owned by the estate would constitute a minority interest for
estate tax purposes.93 Assume that Earl’s will or living trust mandates
that a portion of his stock pass directly to Betty in order to secure a
marital deduction to eliminate any estate tax liability. Betty would end
up directly owning a controlling interest in the stock, which would be
valued as such for estate tax purposes on her death. In contrast, assume
90. See Estate of Chenoweth v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1577, 1588–90 (1987).
91. See supra Section III.E.1.
92. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II); Estate of Rinaldi v. United States., 97-2 U.S.T.C. 60,281
(Fed. Cl. 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-065 (Aug. 30, 1991).
93. See Estate of Bright v. United States., 658 F.2d 999, 1002–03 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Rev.
Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202; Mooneyham v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2445, 2447 (1991); Ward
v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78, 107–09 (1986).
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that Earl had left the requisite marital deduction stock to a QTIP trust to
secure the marital deduction. The stock owned by the QTIP, although
not owned by Betty, would be taxed in her estate. Both Betty and the
QTIP would own minority stock interests that, if aggregated, would
constitute a controlling interest. Even though both interests would be
taxed in Betty’s estate, they would be valued for estate tax purposes as
two separate minority interests, not one controlling interest.94 The lesson
is that use of a QTIP in designing any gift or testamentary marital
deduction components of the plan may preserve valuable discounts that
otherwise would be lost with direct inter-spousal transfers.
4.

The Permission Sale QTIP Trap

This trap occurs when the QTIP trust is funded with stock of the
family corporation and the trustee of the QTIP is restricted from selling
the stock without the consent of a third party. Suppose, for example, that
Earl dies and a portion of his stock is used to fund a QTIP trust that is
intended to qualify for the marital deduction, and the family buy-sell
agreement prohibits any family member or trust from selling stock
without the consent of Jeff, the CEO. Such a consent requirement likely
would destroy the QTIP trust from qualifying for the marital deduction.
A key QTIP requirement is that all income of the trust must be paid to
the surviving spouse at least annually.95 To protect this right of the
surviving spouse, regulations provide that the QTIP trust must require
the trustee to convert stock into income producing property on the
request of the surviving spouse.96 The Service has ruled that this
requirement will not be satisfied if any stock sale is conditioned on the
consent of another family member.97 The key to avoiding the trap is to
ensure that any stock consent requirements imposed by the family buysell agreement are not applicable to the trustee of any QTIP trust.
The QTIP trust is an essential element of most transition plans. It
bridges the gap between the deaths of the parents, eliminates estate taxes
on the death of the first parent, ensures that each parent can control the
ultimate disposition of his or her property, provides management and
creditor protection benefits, and preserves precious valuation discounts.
94. Estate of Bonner v. United States., 84 F.3d 196, 197–98 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate of Mellinger
v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 26, 32–37 (1999), action on dec., 1999-006 (Aug. 30, 1999).
95. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (as amended in 2003).
97. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-47-065.(July 12, 1991).
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Although it adds complexity on the death of the first spouse, in most
cases the QTIP will be far superior to the alternative of leaving stock
directly to the surviving spouse. The challenge is to customize each
spouse’s QTIP to meet the parents’ objectives and to avoid the technical
traps that compromise the all-important marital deduction.
F.

Compensation Transition Opportunities

In most situations, one or more children are key officers in the
company at the time the transmission plan is put in motion. Frequently
the fear is that stock passing to these children will be deemed to be
taxable compensation, not gifts that are income tax-free. In our case
study, for example, this could be a concern as Jeff starts receiving more
stock. In fact, usually it is preferable to actually structure the stock
transfers as compensation income from the corporation. Although such
transfers trigger taxable income to the child,98 the corporation receives
an offsetting tax deduction,99 and, in nearly all cases, the corporation’s
income tax savings will equal or exceed the child’s income tax cost.100
The result is a zero net income tax burden, and a simple gross-up cash
bonus can be used to transfer to the child the corporation’s tax savings to
cover the child’s income tax hit.101 So from a current income tax
98. Under section 83(a), recognition of taxable income is deferred so long as the stock is subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture unless the recipient makes an election under section 83(b) to
accelerate the recognition of income. See I.R.C. § 83(a), (b).
99. See id. § 83(h). Note, however, that if the service provided is capital in nature, the corporation
will have to capitalize the expenditure. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(4) (as amended in 2003).
100. This common outcome is a result of the comparative marginal tax rates applicable to C
corporations and individuals. A C corporation will be subject to a marginal rate of at least 34
percent once its annual income exceeds $75,000. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(C) (2006). For an individual
joint-income filer in 2008, the taxable income thresholds for the 28 percent rate, the 33 percent rate,
and the maximum 35 percent rate are $131,450, $200,300, and $337,700, respectively.
101. The “gross up” is accomplished by the corporation agreeing to use the cash benefit from its
deduction to pay the child a cash bonus to cover his or her tax hit on the stock and the cash bonus.
With marginal corporate rates in the 34 to 35 percent range after the low-end brackets (brackets for
the first $75,000 of earnings) and top individual marginal rates in the 33 percent to 35 percent range,
such a gross-up cash bonus often can be made with no after-tax cash cost to the corporation. The
formula for calculating the gross-up bonus is as follows:
[Stock Value / (1 – Executive Marginal Tax Rate)] – Stock Value = Gross-Up Bonus
Assuming the child is in a 33 percent marginal tax bracket, the formula would produce a gross-up
bonus of $49,254 on a transfer of stock valued at $100,000 [[100,000 / (1 - .33)] – 100,000]. If the
corporation is subject to a 34 percent marginal rate, the cash tax savings to the corporation would be
$50,746 (34 percent of $149,254), which more than covers the cash bonus to child. As an alternative
to such a gross-up bonus, the corporation could use its tax cash savings to loan the child the funds
needed to cover his or her tax hit in the year of recognition, with the understanding that the loan
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perspective, the compensation structure usually is no worse than a push
with the gift option. But the compensation structure offers two big
advantages that could never be realized with a gift. First, unlike a gift
where the child takes the parent’s carryover basis in the stock,102 a
compensation transfer results in the child receiving a basis in the stock
equal to its fair market value at time of transfer.103 Second, with the
compensation structure, the parent has no gift tax concerns, and there are
no gift tax opportunity costs. The transaction does not consume any of
the parent’s gift tax annual exclusion or unified credit benefits.
Often there are opportunities to use the compensation process to
dramatically accelerate the equity transition process. Suppose, for
example, that in lieu of receiving more stock, or perhaps in addition to
receiving additional stock, Jeff is given a contractual right to
compensation that is structured to provide the same economic benefits as
stock. A deferred compensation contract is used to pay benefits based on
Jeff’s hypothetical ownership of a designated number of common stock
shares. The written contract offers a medley of economic benefits based
on the “phantom” stock, including dividend equivalency payments and
payments based on the value of the phantom shares (determined at the
time of the event) if the company is sold or merged or if Jeff dies,
becomes disabled, or otherwise terminates his employment.104 The
arrangement offers a number of tax benefits. First, there is no threat that
Jeff will end up having to report taxable income without having received
a like amount of cash, a “phantom income” condition that is often
triggered when stock is transferred to an employee as compensation.105
Because all amounts paid to Jeff are compensation under a contract, Jeff
will not have any taxable income until he actually receives payment.
Second, there are no gift tax concerns for Earl and Betty even though the
rights under the contract transferred substantial value to Jeff. Third,
because all amounts paid to Jeff represent compensation, the company
receives a full deduction at the time of payment.106 In many ways, such a
contractual arrangement is one of the most efficient strategies, from a tax
amount plus accrued interest would be repaid at some point in the future. Obviously, the child
would much prefer the bonus structure.
102. See I.R.C. § 1015(a).
103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-4(b) (1978); I.R.C. § 1012.
104. For a discussion of the planning opportunities and traps of such arrangements, see supra
DRAKE, supra note 8, at ch. 12.
105. See I.R.C. § 83(a).
106. See id. § 162(a).
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perspective, for transferring equity value.
Are there any tax disadvantages to such an arrangement? Historically,
the biggest disadvantage has been the absence of any capital gains break
for the child. Because the child never receives real stock under the
contract, there is no possibility of creating a capital gain at time of sale.
To sweeten the deal for the child, an added bonus may be provided to
produce a net after-tax yield to the child that is equal to the yield that
would result if the phantom stock payment was taxed as a capital gain.
Again, the company gets a full deduction for all amounts paid. Often this
capital gains “make-up” bonus can be paid with the company still
incurring a net after-tax cost that is less than would be incurred if it
issued real stock and later had to purchase the real stock under a buy-sell
agreement. For example, assume in our case that Jeff’s marginal
ordinary income tax rate is 33 percent and his capital gains rate is 15
percent. Jeff would net 85 cents on every dollar of capital gain
recognized on the sale of real stock to the corporation under a buy-sell
agreement. Under a phantom stock contract with a capital gain gross-up
bonus, the corporation would have to pay Jeff $1.27 to net Jeff the same
85 cents after Jeff’s 33 percent marginal ordinary rate is applied. But if
the corporation is subject to a marginal rate of 34 percent, the $1.27
payment would cost the company only 84 cents on a net after-tax basis,
which is 16 percent less than the after-tax cost the company would need
to expend to buy real stock from Jeff under a buy-sell agreement.
With any such deferred compensation plan, great care must be taken
to ensure that it avoids the reaches of new section 409A, added by the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.107 Generally, this will require (1)
that any compensation deferral elections of the employee be made before
the close of the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the
related services are actually rendered, (2) that the authorized events that
may trigger payment of benefits under the contract (i.e. separation from
service, specified time, change in control, unforeseen emergency) be
specified in the contract (no elections as to timing of payments), (3) that
there be no acceleration or further deferral of benefits, (4) that assets not
be placed in a trust or other arrangement outside of the United States to
pay benefits under the contract, and (5) that assets not be restricted to the
payment of benefits under the contract based on changes in the
company’s financial health.108
107. See id. § 409A.
108. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.409A-2(a), (b), 1.409A-3 (2007); I.R.C. § 409A(b)(1), (2).
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IV. CORPORATE TRANSITION STRATEGIES
The plan design usually includes a program for transferring stock to
other family members while one or both of the parents are living. The
strategic options include gifts of stock to other family members or trusts
established for their benefit, sales of stock to the corporation, and sales
of stock to other family members or trusts. No option is clearly superior
to the others; each has disadvantages and limitations that need to be
carefully evaluated. Often a combination approach is the best alternative.
Plus, in some cases the need to actually transfer stock may be mitigated
by business restructuring techniques that have the effect of transitioning
future value without actually transferring stock.
A.

Gifting Strategies

The gift strategy is clearly the simplest and easiest to comprehend.
The parents seek to reduce their future estate tax exposure by gifting
stock and other property to family members. The challenge is to
structure the gifts to avoid or minimize all gift taxes on the transfers. In
our case study, Earl and Betty could commence a program of gifting
Wilson corporate stock to Jeff, the child involved in the business, and
gifting other assets to other family members. For gift tax purposes, the
value of any gifted stock may qualify for lack of marketability and
minority interest discounts, which together may equal as much as 40
percent.109
Earl and Betty each have a gift tax annual exclusion that shelters from
gift taxes any gifts of present property interests up to $12,000 to a single
donee in a single year.110 All gifts of stock and other assets that fall
within the scope of this $12,000 annual exclusion will be removed from
Earl and Betty’s estates for estate tax purposes.111 Earl and Betty have 10
potential donees in their immediate family—three children, three
spouses of children, and four grandchildren. At $24,000 per donee
($12,000 for each parent), Earl and Betty’s annual gift tax exclusions
would enable them to collectively transfer tax-free $240,000 of
discounted value each year to immediate family members. If discounts
109. See, e.g., Rakow v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2066, 2073 (1999); Estate of Dailey v.
Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 710, 712 (2001); Janda v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1100, 1101,
1104–05 (2001).
110. See I.R.C. § 2503(b).
111. See id. §§ 2001, 2503(b).
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are factored in at 40 percent, this simple strategy could shift up to
$400,000 of value out of Earl and Betty’s estates each year. During a
ten-year period, the future value of property removed from Earl and
Betty’s taxable estates and transitioned tax-free with their annual gift tax
exclusions could reasonably be expected to exceed $5.8 million.112
Simple 2503(c) trusts could be used for all heirs under age 21 to avoid
future interest problems that would otherwise compromise the
availability of the annual exclusion. If grandchildren are the trust
beneficiaries, care should be taken to meet the requirements of section
2642(c)(2) to ensure an inclusion ratio of zero for generation skipping
tax purposes and no generation skipping tax liability.113
In addition to their annual gift tax exclusions, Earl and Betty each
have their lifetime gift tax unified credits and their generation skipping
tax (GST) exemptions.114 The gift tax unified credit enables each of
them to make tax-free gifts of up to $1 million that are not otherwise
sheltered by the annual exclusion. The GST exemption permits each of
them to make GST tax-free transfers of up $2 million during life or at
death. If the company stock and other gifted assets are expected to grow
in value (a reasonable assumption in most cases), early use of the gift tax
unified credits and the GST exemptions will produce future estate and
generation skipping tax benefits because all appreciation in the value of
the gifted property accruing subsequent to the date of the transfers will
be excluded from the parents’ taxable estates.115
Gifts also have income tax consequences. As the common stock is
transferred, any income rights attributable to that stock also are
transferred. If, as in our case study, the corporation is a C corporation,
any future dividends attributable to the gifted stock will be paid and
taxed to the family members who own the stock. If the entity is an S
corporation, the pass-through tax impacts attributable to the gifted stock
will flow to the children and grandchildren who own the stock.

112. This assumes that the annual gift tax exclusion continues to escalate in $1,000 increments as
it has done in the past and that the value of the business grows at a rate of 6 percent per annum.
113. The grandchild must be the sole beneficiary of the trust during life, and the trust assets must
be included in grandchild’s estate if the grandchild dies before the trust terminates. See I.R.C.
§ 2642(c)(2).
114. See id. §§ 2505, 2631.
115. Because the tentative estate tax calculated under I.R.C. § 2001(b) and (c) is based on the
amount of the decedent’s taxable estate and the amount of adjusted taxable gifts made by the
decedent, any appreciation accruing on gifted property subsequent to the date of transfer is excluded
from the calculation.
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1.

Gift Taxes Now? A Hard Sell

Many parents have an interest in the gifting strategy so long as no gift
taxes need to be paid. The strategy becomes much less appealing when
the possibility of paying gift taxes is factored into the mix. In our case
study, should Earl and Betty consider making taxable gift transfers—
transfers that exceed the limits of their annual exclusions and their gift
tax unified credits⎯in hopes of avoiding larger estate tax burdens down
the road? There are two potential benefits to such transfers. First, all
future appreciation on the gifted property will be excluded from the
donor’s taxable estate. Second, if the gift is made at least three years
before death, the gift taxes paid by the transferring parent are not subject
to any transfer taxes, resulting in a larger net transfer to the donee.116 For
example, if Betty dies with an additional $1 million included in her
taxable estate that is subject to a 45 percent marginal estate tax rate, the
net after-tax amount available to her heirs will equal $550,000. In
contrast, if Betty had expended that same $1 million at least three years
prior to her death by making a gift of $689,000 to a child and paying gift
taxes at the rate of 45 percent on such gift ($311,000), the child would
end up netting an additional $139,000 (the taxes otherwise imposed on
the gift taxes), plus any appreciation on the property occurring
subsequent to the gift. If the donor parent dies within three years of the
gift, section 2035(b) pulls the gift taxes paid by the parent back into the
parent’s taxable estate, and the tax benefit is lost.
Do these potential benefits justify writing a big gift tax check now in
hopes of saving bigger estate taxes down the road? Most private
business owners have little or no appetite for this potential opportunity.
Their reluctance to seriously consider the possibility is bolstered by their
understandable desire to defer any and all taxes as long as possible and
wishful dialog they have heard regarding the potential demise of the
federal estate tax. As a result, many families confine their gifts of stock
to transfers that are fully tax-protected by the annual exclusion or the
unified credit.
2.

Gifting Disadvantages

Although the gifting strategy may result in a reduction of future estate
taxes and a shifting of income, it has its disadvantages and limitations.
116. Any gift taxes paid within three years of death are taxed in the decedent’s estate. See id. §
2035(b).
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For many parents, the biggest disadvantage is the one-way nature of a
gift; they receive nothing in return to help fund their retirement needs
and provide a hedge against an uncertain future. In our case study, for
example, the strategy does nothing to address Earl and Betty’s primary
goal of having a secure retirement income from the business for the
balance of their lives. Their insecurities may be heightened as they see
their stock being gifted away over time. The receipt of life insurance on
the death of the first spouse may reduce or eliminate the insecurities of
the survivor, but so long as they are both living and trying to adjust to
their new, less-involved life style, their financial security will be priority
one. To help secure their retirement income, the company may agree to
pay Earl ongoing compensation benefits for consulting services or
perhaps an agreement not to compete. There are disadvantages to this
compensation approach. There always is the risk that the payments will
not be recognized as deductible compensation for income tax purposes,
but rather will be characterized as nondeductible dividends.117 Plus,
compensation payments will trigger ongoing payroll taxes.118
Another option for securing a steady income for Earl and Betty is to
pay dividends on the stock that they have retained. There are a number
of disadvantages with the dividend alternative. First, it produces a
double tax⎯one at the corporate level and one at the shareholder level.
Although the pain of this double tax has been softened by the reduction
of the C corporation dividend tax rate to 15 percent, there is still a
double tax, and the 15 percent dividend break, absent future action by
Congress, will expire at the end of 2010. Conversion to S status may
help eliminate the double tax hit moving forward, but, as explained
above, the conversion itself is not tax-hassle free.119 Second, since
children will be receiving stock, corresponding pro rata dividend
payments will need to be made to the children. This just aggravates the
double tax problem and does nothing to accomplish the parents’
objectives.
Another disadvantage of the gifting strategy relates to Jeff’s plan for
the future. Because a gifting strategy is usually implemented in
incremental steps over a lengthy period of time to maximize use of the

117. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7, 1.162-8 (2006).
118. The 2008 payroll tax burden is 15.3 percent of the first $102,000 of compensation and 2.9
percent of the compensation paid in excess of $102,000. SSA Pub. No. 05-10003, Jan. 2008, ICN
451385.
119. See supra Section III.C.
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annual gift tax exclusion and to ensure that the parent’s have retained at
all times sufficient stock for their future needs, the plan may frustrate or
at least badly dilute Jeff’s goal of garnering the fruits of his future efforts
for himself. If Jeff is successful in expanding and growing the business,
his success will be reflected pro rata in the value of all of the common
stock, including the stock retained by Earl and Betty and any common
stock gifted to Kathy and Paul and other family members.
Finally, there’s an income tax disadvantage to the gifting strategy.
The tax basis of any stock owned by a parent at death will be stepped up
to the fair market value of the stock at death.120 If Earl and Betty make
gifts of stock, their low basis in the stock will be carried over to their
donees,121 and the opportunity for the basis step-up at death is lost
forever. This can be significant if a donee sells the stock down the road.
In a community property state, this disadvantage is substantially
eliminated for all gifts made after the death of the first spouse because
all community property (even the surviving spouse’s interest) receives a
tax basis step-up on the death of the first spouse.122
These potential disadvantages need to be carefully evaluated in the
design of any transition plan. The result in many situations is a gifting
program that starts slowly, perhaps geared to the limits of the annual gift
tax exclusion, then accelerates as the parents become increasingly more
secure in their new “uninvolved” status, and then shifts into high gear
following the death of the first spouse. In other cases, the fear of future
estate taxes prompts the parents to aggressively embrace the gifting
strategy and explore options for enhancing their stock gifting options.
Following is a description of enhanced stock gifting strategies that are
often considered.
3.

The GRAT⎯A Square Peg?

The grantor retained annuity trust (“GRAT”) is a proven darling in
the estate planning world. For large estates wrapped up in the challenge
of juggling many valuable marbles, its allure often is irresistible. Its
value in transitioning a family business, a mountain, is far more
problematic. Often, when all factors are fairly considered, the GRAT
ends up being the proverbial square peg that just doesn’t fit the situation.

120. I.R.C. § 1014(a).
121. Id. § 1015(a).
122. Id. § 1014(a), (b)(6).
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With a GRAT, the parent transfers property to a trust and retains an
annuity, expressed as either a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of the
fair market value of the property transferred, for a specified timeframe,
expressed as a term of years, the life of the grantor, or the shorter of the
two. The annuity must be paid at least annually, and its payment may not
be contingent on the income of the trust.123 That is, if necessary, annuity
payments must be funded out of trust principal. The trust may not issue a
“note, other debt instrument, option, or other similar arrangement” to
pay the annuity.124 No additional property may be contributed until the
annuity term ends,125 nor may payments be made to any person other
than the grantor.
The contributed property is deemed to have two valuation
components for gift tax purposes. The first component (Annuity
Component) has a value based on the size of the designated annuity
payment and the annuity tables under section 7520, which incorporate an
interest rate equal to 120 percent of the applicable federal midterm
rate.126 The value of the second component (“Remainder Component”) is
the excess of the value of the property transferred to the trust less the
value of the Annuity Component. At the time the trust is created, the
parent is deemed to have made a gift equal to only the value of the
Remainder Component. At the end of the annuity term, all remaining
property in the trust is transferred to the designated beneficiaries, usually
children, with no further gift tax consequences. Plus, the property is
removed from the parent’s estate for estate tax purposes.
A GRAT creates two key risks⎯a mortality risk and a yield risk. The
mortality risk is that all tax objectives will be lost if the parent dies
before the end of the designated annuity term. If the parent dies
prematurely, the entire value of the property will be subject to estate
taxes in the parent’s estate under section 2036(a).127 The entire effort
will have produced nothing. The yield risk recognizes that the GRAT

123. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(d) (2006).
124. Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(i).
125. Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(5).
126. I.R.C. § 7520.
127. Section 2036(a) is triggered because the parent will possess a retained income interest at
death. Although technically section 2039 would also be triggered on death because the annuity
payments likely will continue after the death of the parent, the Service recently issued Proposed
Regulation § 20.2036-1(c) that mandates the application of section 2036(a), not section 2039, in
such a situation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(c), 72 Fed. Reg. 31487 (July 9, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2007-28_IRB/ar13.html.
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will not produce any net transfer tax benefit if the yield on the property
held in the trust (including its growth in value) during the annuity term
does not exceed the section 7520 rate used to value the Annuity
Component. If the property’s yield cannot beat the 7520 rate, the parent
would be better off for transfer tax purposes if he or she, in lieu of the
GRAT, had simply made a completed gift of property equal in value to
the Remainder Component free of any mortality risk factor.128 For the
GRAT to pay off, the parent must beat both risks – live longer than the
annuity term and have the trust property produce a yield superior to the
7520 rate.129
a.

The Real Goal⎯Something for Nothing

Given the mortality and yield risks, often the GRAT is a tough sell if
a substantial gift tax burden is triggered on its creation. Because the
Remainder Component is a future interest, the gift tax annual exclusion
is not available. The parent’s unified credit is usually better spent on
other transfers (e.g. life insurance dynasty trust insurance premiums) that
are guaranteed to produce real transfer tax benefits; the opportunity cost
of expending the credit on a risk-laden GRAT often just does not pencil.
And, the thought of actually paying significant gift taxes on a transfer
that might produce no estate tax benefits is rejected outright by many as
absurd. So, the strategy of choice often is to structure the annuity so that
the Annuity Component nearly equals the value of the contributed
property, and the Reminder Component has little or no value. This
“zero-out” strategy, made possible by the Tax Court’s 2000 decision in
Walton v. Commissioner,130 is accomplished by structuring the annuity
128. There are other differences that could favor a direct gift when the yield risk is a problem. A
direct gift may qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion under section 2503(b); a future interest
transfer to a trust has no hope of qualifying. Plus, any appreciation on property subject to a direct
gift will be excluded from the donor’s taxable estate; any trust property may be taxed in the donor’s
estate under section 2036(a) at its full date of death value. I.R.C. § 2036(a).
129. Arguments are sometimes advanced for the proposition that, in extreme situations, a GRAT
may pay in the end even if it does not beat the yield risk. Examples include a situation where a large
block of marketable stock subject to a blockage discount is transferred to a GRAT and then sold off
in pieces or where large losses in a transferred portfolio are recognized before larger gains. See, e.g.,
Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Diana S.C. Zeydel, Comparing GRATs and Installment Sales, 41ST
ANNUAL HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING, 2-1, 2-9 (Tina Portuondo ed., 2007). Such
theories, although potentially applicable to marble shifters, are of no help with a transition plan for a
closely held family corporation.
130. 115 T.C. 589 (2000). In Walton, the Tax Court struck down old Example 5 in regulation
25.2702-3(e) by holding that an annuity payable for a term of years to a grantor or the grantor’s
estate is a qualified annuity for a specified term of years and can be valued as such, regardless of
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to be paid to the parent or the parent’s estate for the designated term and
setting the annuity payments high enough to create the desired Annuity
Component value. When this strategy is used, the GRAT becomes a
“Heads I Win, Tails I Break Even” scenario. If either the mortality or the
yield risk becomes a problem, the parent, although back to square one,
has lost nothing because no gift tax costs (either real or opportunity)
were incurred. If, however, both risks are avoided and any property
remains in the GRAT at the end of the annuity term, that property will
pass to the designated remainder beneficiaries free of all transfer taxes. It
offers a clear shot at “something for nothing.” With this “zero-out”
strategy, even the mortality risk can be mitigated by setting a short
annuity term131 and mandating big annuity payments that, in large part,
will be funded from trust principal. The Service does not like this zeroout strategy; it will not issue a private letter ruling on the qualification of
a GRAT if the Reminder Component has a value of less than 10 percent
of the contributed property.132 Many are not deterred by this position of
the Service and pursue the zero-out strategy on the theory that it is
consistent with the regulations to section 2702 and that any future
changes to the regulations likely would be applied on a prospective basis
only. Others build a formula into the GRAT that would automatically
adjust the retained annuity if there is a subsequent determination as to
the legally required value of the Remainder Component.
b.

The GRAT and Closely Held Stock

Stock of a closely held corporation may be used to fund a GRAT.
Even stock in an S corporation will work because a grantor trust is an
eligible S corporation shareholder,133 and the GRAT can qualify as a
grantor trust by requiring that the annuity payments first be paid out of
whether the grantor survives the term. Id. at 603. The case opened the door to zero-out GRAT’s
because the fixed term can be used to value the Annuity Component. The result was a new Example
5 and 6, which are commonly referred to as the “Walton” Regulations. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(e),
exs. (5) & (6).
131. The minimum term of a GRAT is a concern of some, based on an earlier position of the IRS
that it would not rule on any GRAT that had a term of less than five years. The GRAT in the famous
Walton case, supra note 130, was two years; the Service did not challenge the 366 day term of a
GRAT in Kerr v. United States, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), aff’d, 292 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2002), and the
Service ruled favorably on a two-year GRAT in PLR 9239015. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9239015 (Sept.
25, 1992).
132. Rev. Proc. 2008-3, 2008-1 I.R.B. IRB 28-1, § 4(51). See also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem 200372, 2003-44 IRB 964.
133. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2).
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trust income.134 But the issue isn’t whether it can be done; it’s whether it
makes any sense to do it. There will be situations where the company’s
growth and cash flow prospects are so strong that the GRAT will offer
an excellent vehicle to leverage the parents’ unified credits or even the
payment of gift taxes. But the cash and yield demands of the GRAT may
prove troublesome for many mature family businesses that are struggling
to maintain market share while sustaining a modest growth curve.
Suppose, for example, that Earl forms a GRAT, names Jeff as the
reminder beneficiary, transfers nonvoting Wilson common stock to the
GRAT equal to 24 percent of the outstanding stock, and determines that
the maximum annual cash distributions the company could afford to
make to the shareholders going forward is $500,000. An amount equal to
24 percent ($120,000) of these annual distributions would be paid on the
stock held in the GRAT to fund Earl’s annuity and the balance would be
paid to the other shareholders, principally Earl and Betty. The value of
the transferred stock for gift tax purposes (assuming a 40 percent
minority interest and lack of marketability discount) would be
$1,440,000.135 If the annuity term was set at five years (remember Earl is
now 65) and the 7520 rate was 5.4 percent (based on the November 2007
applicable federal rate), the Reminder component would trigger a
taxable gift of $926,160 based on an annual annuity of $120,000.136 If
the mortality risk was extended to 10 years, the Remainder Component
gift tax value would drop to $531,132.137
Any person who contemplates funding a GRAT with family stock
should carefully focus on following four practical questions that, if
ignored or understated, may result in the family spending a great deal of
effort and money on a structure that backfires in the end.
First, how is the trust going to fund the annuity payments? Many
businesses may conclude that double-taxed dividends from their C
corporation or single-taxed income from their S corporation will not do
the job unless the annuity term is very long (thus escalating the mortality
risk beyond any reasonable period) or the parent incurs substantial gift
tax costs (either real or opportunity) up front against the risks inherent in
the GRAT. And if a decision is made to bail out corporate earnings as
134. Id. § 677(a).
135. Computation: $10,000,000 x .24 x. 60 = $1,440,000.
136. Computation: $1,440,000 – [$120,000 x 4.282 (Table B five year factor)] = $926,160. This
assumes the annuity is paid annually and the Table K value is 1.
137. Computation: $1,440,000 – [$120,000 x 7.5739 (Table B ten year factor)] = $531,132. This
assumes the annuity is paid annually and the Table K value is 1.
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fast as possible to help the GRAT, what impact will this bail out strategy
have on other shareholders and the strength of the business? And if large
sums of cash are regularly withdrawn from the business, what will be the
resulting negative impacts on the value of the business which, among
other things, might magnify many times the yield risk factor of the
GRAT? For example, if Earl’s GRAT described above has a five-year
term and an annual annuity obligation of $120,000, the company would
have to distribute $2.5 million to its shareholders over the next five years
against the hope that Earl will outlive the five-year term and that the
compounded annual growth of the company (even with these
distributions) will still beat the 7520 rate and the resulting impact in the
growth in Earl’s estate resulting from his share of the distributions.
Second, does the zero-out strategy (the play that gets so many so
excited) make any sense in the situation? If the GRAT is structured to
have a “zero-out” Remainder Component by funding large annuity
payments out of principal, the trust likely will end up transferring stock
back to the parent to fund the annuity. If, for example, Earl desires to
have the GRAT described above structured as a zero-out GRAT with a
five-year term, the annual annuity payment would need to be
$336,291.138 If funded by cash from the company, this would require
annual shareholder cash distributions of $1,401,212,139 a total of more
than $7 million over five years. For most companies presently valued at
$10 million, such numbers would be impossible and certainly would
make no sense if the expectation is that the company will grow in value
and thereby produce transfer tax savings through the GRAT. So the only
hope of zeroing out the Remainder Component is to transfer stock back
to Earl to fund the huge annuity payments. This stock recycling will
necessitate costly annual stock valuations that will serve conflicting
objectives. For GRAT purposes, it will be desirable to have such
valuations confirm high growth to beat the GRAT’s yield risk, when in
fact such high growth confirmations likely will create larger transfer tax
problems on all other fronts, not the least of which is the future estate tax
impacts of the very shares that are being transferred back to the parent in
the form of annuity payments.
Third, will the need to beat the yield risks inherent in the GRAT be at
cross purposes with other efforts that the family takes to facilitate

138. Computation: $1,440,000 / 4.282 (Table B five year factor) = $336,291. This assumes the
annuity is paid annually and the Table K value is 1.
139. Computation: $336,291 / .24 = $1,401,212.
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transition planning by holding down the stock value? Such efforts, for
example, may include strategies to segregate new expansion growth
opportunities and to adopt equity-based compensation structures for key
children in the business.
Finally, what will the GRAT say to key inside children, such as Jeff,
who are anxious to take over the reins and build the business? “We are
going to expend real effort and money on a complicated trust structure
that possibly may save some taxes and net you a few shares many years
down the road if Dad can outlive the term of the annuity, if we can blow
big money out of the corporation, and if we can still demonstrate that the
value of the stock is escalating at a fast pace that may make other
transfer strategies more difficult and may result in higher estate taxes
when Dad dies.” The inside child might start looking for a new job.
The forgoing questions should be carefully evaluated whenever a
GRAT is being considered as an element of a family business transition
plan. Often, though not always, the analysis will quickly demonstrate
that the GRAT serves no critical objectives of the family. For many
families, it will once again confirm the reality that stock of the family
business often should not be treated the same as a portfolio of publicly
traded securities.
4.

The Preferred Stock Freeze⎯A Very Rare Fit

Another enhanced gifting strategy is the preferred stock freeze. It
requires that the family corporation be recapitalized140 with both
preferred and common stock. All of the growth in value is reflected in
the common stock that is gifted or sold to children over time. The
parents retain significant voting and income rights through the preferred
stock that has a fixed value. The goal is to reduce future estate taxes by
140. The recapitalization can be accomplished as a tax-free reorganization. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E)
(2006). If common stock is exchanged for common and preferred stock, the shareholders will not
recognize any gain under section 354, and the corporation will be entitled to nonrecognition
treatment. Id. § 354. Each shareholder’s basis in his or her old common shares will carryover and be
allocated to the new common and preferred shares based on their respective fair market values. Id.
§ 358(a), (b); Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2) (2007). The preferred stock received in the
recapitalization will be considered “Section 306 stock” if the effect of the transaction was
substantially the same as the receipt of a stock dividend. I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(B). The regulations
mandate a cash substitution test for the dividend “effect” determination—if cash had been received
instead of preferred stock—would it have been treated as a dividend under section 356(a)(2)? See
Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d) (2007). Thus, if each shareholder receives a proportionate amount or
common and preferred stock, a likely scenario in a family corporation recapitalization, the preferred
stock will be section 306 stock.
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transferring the future growth in the business to the children through the
common stock. Note that this preferred stock strategy will not work for
an S corporation because of the single class of stock eligibility
requirement.141
This freeze strategy will work only if the valuation rules of section
2701 of the Code are satisfied.142 Under these rules, the value of the
common stock transferred to the children for gift tax purposes is based
on a subtraction method of valuation, which subtracts the value of the
parent’s retained preferred stock and other non-transferred family equity
interests from the fair market value of all family-held interests in the
corporation.143 If the income rights of the preferred stock retained by the
parents are not “qualified payment” rights, such preferred stock will be
deemed to have a zero value under section 2701.144 In such event, the
transferred common stock’s value for gift tax purposes will be based on
the value of the parents’ entire equity interest⎯a disastrous gift tax
result.
Section 2701 applies to transfers among family members.145 For the
preferred stock to have a value under section 2701 (and thus reduce the
value of the gifted common stock), the preferred stock must mandate a
“qualified payment,” which is defined as a fixed rate cumulative
dividend payable at least annually.146 The value of the preferred stock
141. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).
142. See id. § 2701.
143. Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-1(a)(2). The subtraction method requires application of a four-step
procedure. See id. § 25.2701-3(a)−(d).
144. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A).
145. Family members include the transferor’s spouse, lineal descendants of the transferor or the
transferor’s spouse, and spouses of such descendants. Id. § 2701(e)(1).
146. Id. § 2701(c)(3). A fixed rate includes any rate that bears a fixed relationship to a specified
market interest rate. Id. § 2701(c)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(b)(6)(ii). Election options are
available to treat, in whole or in part, a qualified payment right as not qualified, in which event it
will be valued at zero under section 2701, or to treat a nonqualified payment right as a qualified
payment, in which event it will valued at its fair market value under section 2701. I.R.C.
§ 2701(c)(3)(C)(i),(ii); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-2(c)(2)(i),(ii). The determination to elect in or out of
qualified payment status depends on the certainty of the fixed payments actually being made. If the
interests are valued as qualified payments and the fixed payments are not made, additional transfer
taxes are imposed on a compounded amount that is calculated by assuming that the unpaid amounts
were invested on the payment due date at a yield equal to the discount rate used to value the
qualified payments. I.R.C. § 2701(d); Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-4. Because gift or estate taxes on
unpaid qualified payments can be painful under this compounding rule, some may choose to forgo
the qualified payment status and avoid the tax risks of nonpayment. Similarly, against the risk of
this compounding rule kicking in for nonpayment, an election may be made to treat a nonqualified
payment right (i.e. noncumulative preferred stock dividend right) as a qualified payment right and
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under section 2701 is based on the fair market value of the qualified
payment.147 An appraisal will set the value by considering all relevant
factors, including comparable rates paid on publicly traded preferred
stock. Thus, as a practical matter, the preferred stock must pay a marketrate dividend in order for its value for gift tax purposes to equal the face
value of the preferred. If the preferred stock is valued under section 2701
based on a “qualified payment” right, the value of the common stock
transferred to the children for gift tax purposes may not be less than a
special “minimum value.”148 The special minimum value is the
children’s pro rata value of all common stock if all the outstanding
common stock had a value equal to 10 percent of all equity interests in
the corporation.149
The strategy triggers two tough challenges that preclude its use except
in the rarest circumstances. First, the cumulative dividend requirement
on the preferred stock is an expensive burden from both a business and
tax perspective. Many closely held corporations simply can’t afford the
cash drain. And all cash distributed will trigger a double tax hit—first at
the corporate level when the income is earned and then at the
shareholder level when the dividends are paid. It is one of the most taxexpensive strategies for moving income. Second, for many mature
businesses, the fair market value of the preferred stock (set by appraisal)
will equal the face value of the preferred only if the fixed dividend rate
on the preferred is set at a level that, as a practical matter, exceeds the
projected annual growth rate of the business. So the preferred dividends
paid to the parents will continue to increase the value of the parents’
taxable estate at least as fast as the status quo. The result is that the
strategy may start producing an immediate double income tax hit with
little or no transfer tax savings. For these reasons, the strategy, although
useful in very unique fast-growth situations, does not fit most family
businesses.

value it as such under section 2701 on the assumption that it always will be paid.
147. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(C). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-1(e) ex. 1. If the preferred stock that
contains the qualified payment also contains a liquidation, put, call, or conversion right, the value of
the preferred stock must be the lowest value based on all such rights. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(B); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2701-2(a)(3).
148. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(A).
149. Id.
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The Three-Year GRIT⎯A Potential Add-On

The three-year grantor retained income trust (“GRIT”) strategy may
be helpful in those situations where a parent has decided to pay gift taxes
now in hopes of saving bigger estate taxes in the future. If the parent
makes a taxable gift and then dies within three years of the gift, all gift
taxes paid by the parent will be subject to estate taxes in the parent’s
estate under section 2035(b). However, the gifted property itself is not
brought back into the parent’s estate and, therefore, does not receive a
stepped-up tax basis under section 1014. If the parent lives for three
years after the gift, the gift taxes are not pulled back into the estate and
avoid all transfer taxes.150
A three-year GRIT may be used to generate a basis step-up if the
parent dies within three years and the gift taxes are subject to estate
taxation. It works by transferring the gifted stock to a trust that requires
that “all income” of the trust be paid to the parent for three years. At the
end of the three-year term, the property passes to a designated donee,
presumably a child. The annuity component of the trust will have a zero
value because the annuity is not specified as a fixed dollar amount or a
percent of the contributed property.151 So the remainder interest for gift
tax purposes will equal the full value of the property.152 If the parent dies
during the three-year term, the property and all gift taxes paid will be
taxable in the parent’s estate, the estate will receive a credit for the prior
gift taxes, and the donee’s basis in the property will be stepped-up to its
fair market value at the parent’s death.153 If the parent outlives the threeyear term, the GRIT will end, and the risk of the paid gift taxes being
included in the estate will have ended.
The disadvantage of this strategy is that, if death occurs within three
years of the gift, any appreciation in the value of the gifted property
from the date of the gift to the date of death will generate an added estate
tax burden. This disadvantage needs to be balanced against the value of
the stepped-up basis to the donee. The 3-year GRIT may make sense in
those rare situations where gift taxes are paid, the basis of the gifted
property is very low in relation to its value, and meaningful appreciation
during the three-year term is unlikely.

150. For an illustration of this transfer tax savings, see supra Section IV.A.1.
151. I.R.C. § 2702(a),(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2702-1–3, 25.2702-2(d) ex. 1.
152. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2702–1(b).
153. I.R.C. §1014.
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All gifting strategies, enhanced or not, require the parents to transfer
something for nothing. Many parents want or need something in return.
They need a strategy that will convert their stock into cash to fund their
retirement and that will stop or slow down the growth in the value of
their taxable estates. A sale of stock might do the job. If the company is
going to stay in the family, the potential buyers include the corporation,
the children, or a trust established for the children.
B.

The Redemption Strategy⎯A Complete Goodbye

A corporate redemption can be used to transition stock in a family
business. It works best in those situations where other family members
already own a substantial percentage of the corporation’s outstanding
stock, the company’s cash flow is strong, the prospects of future stock
value growth are high, and the parents have fully surrendered the reins to
the business or are prepared to do so. It is not a viable option for many.
In our case study, the corporation would contract to purchase⎯to
redeem⎯all of Earl and Betty’s stock in the corporation for a price equal
to the fair market value of the stock. The corporation would pay the
purchase price, plus interest, over a long period of time, as much as 15
years.154 Immediately following the redemption, the only outstanding
stock of the corporation would be the stock owned by Jeff. Although not
a party to the redemption, Jeff would end up owning 100 percent of the
outstanding stock of the corporation and would be in complete control.
The corporation would have a large debt that would be payable to its
former shareholders, Earl and Betty.155 This debt would be retired with
154. The IRS ruling guidelines indicate that the Service will not issue a favorable ruling on a
redemption if the note payment period exceeds 15 years or if the stock is held in escrow or as
security for the corporation’s obligation to make payments under the note. Rev. Proc. 2008-3,
§§ 3.01(31), 4.01(20), 2008-1 I.R.B. 110. If the note term is too long, the risk is that the parents will
be deemed to have retained an equity interest that (1) violates the “creditor only” requirement of
section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), (2) precludes waiver of the family attribution rules of section 318(a)(1) and
a complete termination of the parents’ interest within the meaning of section 302(b)(3), and (3)
results in the amounts distributed to the parents being taxed as dividends. I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(3),
302(c)(1)–(2), 302(d), 318(a)(1). The Tax Court has been more forgiving. In Lisle v. Commissioner,
35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627, 636–40 (1976), the court found that a valid section 302(b)(3) complete
termination had occurred even though the payment term was 20 years, the shareholder retained
voting rights through a security agreement, and the stock was held in escrow to secure the
corporation’s payment obligation.
155. In any such redemption, the applicable state corporate law must be carefully analyzed to
ascertain any applicable restrictions and impacts on the parents. Often appraisals are necessary. The
Model Business Corporation Act, adopted in whole or part as the corporation statute of 30 states,
prohibits a “distribution” (broadly defined to include proceeds from a redemption, MCBA §
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corporate earnings over an extended period of time. The interest and
principal payments on the indebtedness would provide Earl and Betty
with a steady stream of income during their retirement. If they die prior
to a complete payout of the contract, the remaining amounts owing on
the contract would become part of their estates and, together with their
other assets, would be allocated to their children in equal shares.
The primary tax challenge that always exists with a corporate
redemption is determining the character of the payments made by the
corporation to the departing shareholders: will they be taxed as corporate
dividends or as true principal and interest payments made in exchange
for stock? If the payments are treated as dividends, they will be fully
taxable to the extent of the corporation’s earnings and profits, and there
will be a tax hit at both the corporate and shareholder levels on the
distributed income. Although the Bush tax cuts reduced the maximum
tax rate on C corporation dividends to 15 percent through 2010,156 it is
anyone’s guess as to what the tax rate on dividends will be after 2010.
However, even with this dividend rate relief, in many situations the
double tax hit will be unacceptable. And if the tax rate on dividends
bounces back up to a level at or near the ordinary income rate, the
dividend scenario tax burden will be intolerable for most. On the other
hand, if the payments are treated as stock consideration payments, the
parents will be allowed to recover their basis in the transferred stock taxfree, the interest element of each payment will be deductible by the
corporation, and the gain element of each payment to the parents will be
taxed as a long-term capital gain. In nearly all cases, the planning
challenge is to structure the redemption to ensure that the payments
qualify as consideration for stock, not dividends.
The answer to this challenge is found in Section 302(b) of the

1.40(6)) if, “after giving it effect: (1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they
become due in the usual course of business; or (2) the corporation’s total assets would be less than
the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount
that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution, to
satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights are superior
to those receiving the distribution.” MBCA § 6.40(c). These two tests, referred to as the “equity
insolvency test” and the “balance sheet test,” have been widely incorporated into state corporate
statutes. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.06.400 (2008), which adopts both tests and
provides that the balance sheet test may be based “either on financial statements prepared on the
basis of accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or on a fair
valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances . . . .”
156. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11), added by P.L. 108-27 and amended by P.L. 108-311.
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Code,157 which specifies the conditions that must be met in order for the
redemption to qualify for exchange treatment. In a family situation, the
only hope is to qualify the redemption as a complete termination of the
parents’ interests under section 302(b)(3). For the Wilson clan, this
would essentially require that Earl and Betty (1) sell all of their stock to
the company in the transaction, (2) have no further interest in the
business other than as creditors, (3) not acquire any interest in the
business (other than through inheritance) during the ten years following
receipt of all payments made to them, (4) not have engaged in stock
transactions with family members during the last 10 years with a
principal purpose of avoiding income taxes, and (5) sign and file with
the Secretary of the Treasury an appropriate agreement.158 If all of these
conditions are met (and they often are), then the family attribution rules
are waived and the parents are able to treat the payments as
consideration for their stock, not dividends.
Usually the most troubling condition is the requirement that the
parents have no interest in the corporation other than that of creditors
following the redemption.159 In our case, neither Earl nor Betty could be
an officer, director, employee, shareholder, or consultant of the
corporation following the redemption.160 It must be a complete goodbye.
This requirement is often viewed as an insurmountable hurdle by a
parent who is departing and turning over the reins with the hope that
payments will keep coming over a long period. One of Earl’s prime
objectives was to stay involved enough to hedge the boredom of
retirement and to ensure that the business remains strong during the
payout period. To qualify for tax exchange treatment under a redemption
strategy, this objective would have to be abandoned.
The redemption approach offers a number of advantages that need to

157. I.R.C. § 302(b). The family ownership attribution rules of section 318 usually make it
impossible for a family transaction to qualify as a redemption that is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend under section 302(b)(1) or as a substantially disproportionate redemption under section
302(b)(2). The only hope is to qualify for a waiver of the family attribution rules and, thereby,
qualify the redemption as a complete redemption of the parent’s interest under section 302(b)(3). Id.
§§ 302(a), 302(b), 318(a)(1)–(a)(3)(A).
158. These are the conditions imposed by section 302(c)(2) to secure a waiver of the family
attribution rules and qualify the redemption as a complete termination under section 302(b)(3). Id.
§§ 302(b)(3), 302(c)(2), 318(a).
159. Id. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
160. See, e.g., Lynch v. Comm’r, 801 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding taxpayers who provide
post-redemption services, either as an employee or independent contractor, as holding prohibited
interests in the corporation).
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be carefully evaluated in each situation. It provides a long-term payment
stream directly from the corporation to the parents. It effectively freezes
the value of the business in the parents’ estates, subject to the
accumulation of interest income that is paid on the installment note. In
our case, all future growth in the stock value would pass to Jeff, the sole
shareholder. Finally, it makes it easy for the accumulated proceeds paid
on the debt and the unpaid balance of the debt to be transferred to the
children in equal shares at the appropriate time, thereby accomplishing
the parents’ objective of giving each child an equal share of their estates.
There are also some compelling disadvantages with the redemption
approach that provide a strong incentive for many families to look for an
alternative. First, the principal payments made to Betty and Earl on the
indebtedness will need to be funded by the corporation with after-tax
dollars. This may create an intolerable cash burden for the corporation in
redeeming the stock. Second, even though large sums of after-tax dollars
will be paid to the parents for their stock, Jeff, the sole stockholder of the
corporation, gets no increase in the tax basis of his stock. Because the
corporation is redeeming the stock and making the payments, there is no
basis impact at the shareholder level. Third, as previously stated, Betty
and Earl are precluded from having any further involvement in the
management and affairs of the company if they want to meet the
requirements of section 302(b)(3) and qualify for exchange tax
treatment. For many family patriarchs, this complete goodbye
requirement alone will kill the strategy. Fourth, the amounts payable to
Betty and Earl will terminate when the note is paid off. Given the size of
the payout in our case, it is unlikely that this potential disadvantage will
be significant. In many smaller situations, the parents may want and
need a regular cash flow that will last as long as one of them is living.
Fifth, if the parents die before the contract is paid in full, the children
who inherit the unpaid contract will pay income taxes on their receipt of
interest and principal payments under the contract. The contract
payments are treated as income in respect of a decedent for income tax
purposes.161 There is no step-up in basis for the children: the income tax
burden survives the parents’ deaths. Sixth, the company takes on a
tremendous debt burden in redeeming the stock. The company may not
have the cash flow to foot such a huge bill and the associated tax
burdens. At a minimum, the cash burden of the debt may adversely
impact Jeff’s capacity to move the company forward or to secure
161. See I.R.C. § 691(a).
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financing that may be necessary to expand the business and accomplish
his objectives for the business.
These disadvantages cause many families to reject the redemption
strategy in the plan design. They prefer a strategy that can be
implemented on an incremental basis over time and that will allow the
parents to have a continuing, but reduced, role in the business.
C.

Cross-Purchase Strategies⎯Where Is the Cash?

A cross-purchase is similar to a redemption, with one big twist: The
purchasers of the parents’ stock are the other shareholders, not the
corporation. In our case, Earl and Betty would still be paid principal and
income payments for a long term, but the payments would come from
Jeff. How does a cross-purchase strategy compare with the redemption
approach? The cross-purchase offers two significant benefits over the
redemption. First, the section 302 dividend fear for the parents goes
away because they are not receiving payments from the corporation.
This means that the parents can stay involved in the business as much as,
and for as long as, they want. Earl can remain on the board and keep his
hands in the operation to the extent he chooses. Plus, there is no
requirement that all of the parent’s stock be sold in a single transaction.
Piecemeal sales work. Thus, the biggest impediment to the redemption
strategy—the complete goodbye—is gone. Second, Jeff’s tax basis in the
purchased stock will equal the purchase price he pays for the stock.162
Unlike the redemption scenario, the amounts paid to Earl and Betty in a
cross-purchase produce a basis increase for the other shareholders.
Apart from these benefits, the cross-purchase approach has many of
the same limitations and disadvantages as the redemption approach.
Principal payments on the installment note must be funded with after-tax
dollars. Jeff’s credit capacity may be tapped. The payouts to the parents
will not extend beyond the contract term. Any basis step-up on the
parents’ deaths is lost. Payments under the contract received by other
family members following the deaths of the parents will be taxed as
income in respect of a decedent.
Plus, the cross-purchase approach presents a whole new problem.
Where is Jeff going to get the cash to cover the payments for the stock?
This problem, alone, eliminates the cross-purchase option in many
situations. If Jeff has an independent source of income or cash that he is

162. See id. § 1012.
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willing to commit to the deal, this funding problem may be solved.
Absent such an independent source, Jeff will be forced to turn to the
corporation for the cash. The challenge then becomes getting enough
corporate cash to Jeff on an ongoing basis to fund the current payments
on the installment note. This can be a tough, often insurmountable,
problem. The extra compensation payments to Jeff must be large enough
to cover the current interest payments on the note, the after-tax principal
payments on the note, and the additional income and payroll taxes that
Jeff will be required to pay as a result of the increased compensation.
Beyond the cash burden to the corporation, if the compensation
payments to Jeff are unreasonably high, there may be a constructive
dividend risk that could put the corporation’s deduction in jeopardy.163
An S election will help the tax situation, but there is still a cash drain on
the company and the double tax risk of a constructive dividend is
avoided only to the extent of earnings during the S corporation period.164
Corporate loans to Jeff might be an option, but corporate loans always
present independent problems. First, the loans will need to be repaid at
some point down the road with after-tax dollars. Figuring out how the
repayments to the corporation will be funded may be more difficult than
Jeff’s current funding challenge with his parents’ note. The loan
approach may simply defer and magnify the problem. Second, the loans
themselves need to be funded with corporate after-tax dollars. The
corporation must pay current income taxes on the funds it loans. And
third, there is always the risk that substantial shareholder loans may
trigger an accumulated earnings tax.165 That is, the corporation may be
forced to unreasonably accumulate earnings to fund the loans. The
bottom line is that the shareholder loan approach to solve the funding
problem in a cross-purchase situation generally is not a satisfactory
solution.
This funding challenge often requires a combination approach that
integrates a cross-purchase with a gift or redemption strategy, or both.
163. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-8, 1.301-1(j) (2007); see, e.g., Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r,
196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999); Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1983);
Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 108, 112–115 (1970).
164. Even with an S election, a taxable dividend exposure remains to the extent of the
corporation’s earnings and profits from its C corporation existence. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2). The
exposure ends once the earnings and profits have been distributed. An S corporation, with the
consent of all affected shareholders, may elect to accelerate such dividends by treating all
distributions as earnings and profits distributions. Id. § 1368(e)(3).
165. See generally id. §§ 531−537; Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(c)(1) (2007) (loans to shareholder for
shareholder’s personal benefit may indicate that earnings are being unreasonably accumulated).
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The parents may gift some stock and have the balance of their stock
redeemed by the corporation or purchased by other family members. It is
possible to structure a corporate redemption of a portion of the parents’
stock and a cross-purchase of the balance of the parents’ stock and still
qualify the redemption for exchange treatment under section 302(b).166
The benefit of a combination approach is that the disadvantages of each
strategy are watered down because only a portion of the stock is subject
to the strategy. For example, only the gifted shares will do nothing to
provide a retirement income to the parents; only the redeemed shares
will need to be funded with corporate after-tax dollars and will not
increase the other shareholders’ stock basis; and only the shares subject
to the cross-purchase obligation will create a funding challenge for the
other shareholders.
There are circumstances where the cross-purchase funding challenge
is not a big deal. This may be the case, for example, if the entity is an S
corporation with strong earnings, if other family members already own a
substantial percentage of the outstanding stock or, as previously stated, if
other family members have substantial investment assets unrelated to the
company. When a cross-purchase is the strategy of choice in the plan
design, two options for enhancing the strategy are often considered.167
These are the intentionally defective grantor trust installment sale and
the self-canceling installment note.
1.

The IDGT Sale⎯A Dream Deal?

With the intentionally defective grantor trust installment sale strategy,
the parent establishes a trust that names one or more children as
beneficiaries. However, the trust is structured so that the parent is
deemed to be the owner of the trust property for income tax purposes,
but not for estate and gift tax purposes. The trust is an income tax
nullity, but triggers real gift and estate tax consequences. The strategy
requires that one have some capacity to speak out of both sides of the
166. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113–
114.
167. The private annuity, a cross-purchase strategy that has been popular in the past, is not
discussed because recent regulations proposed by the Internal Revenue Service have effectively
eliminated the tax deferral benefit of the annuity and, thereby, destroyed the private annuity as a
viable transition option. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(j) (providing that any person who sells
property in exchange for any annuity contract will be deemed to have received “property in an
amount equal to the fair market value of the contract, whether or not the contract is the equivalent of
cash”).
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mouth. The entire basis of the strategy is the incongruity between the
income tax grantor trust rules168 and the estate tax rules applicable to
grantor-retained interests.169 Although there is a broad overlap between
these rules, there are a few instances where a trust may be crafted to fall
within the income tax rules without triggering the estate tax inclusion
rules. One such instance (commonly used to achieve the desired result)
is where the parent retains a non-fiduciary power to reacquire trust
property by substituting other property of equivalent value. With such a
power, the parent may be deemed to be the owner of the trust for income
tax purposes,170 but not for estate and gift tax purposes.171
The parent then sells his or her corporate stock to the trust in return
for an installment note that has a principal balance equal to the fair
market value of the transferred stock. The principal balance of the note,
together with interest at the applicable federal rate (a rate that generally
is less than the section 7520 rate applicable to annuities), is paid by the
trust to the parent over the term of the note. The trust’s income and any
other assets owned by the trust are used to fund the amounts due to the
parent under the installment note. The strategy can be used with either C
or S corporation stock because a grantor trust is an eligible S corporation
shareholder.172
a.

The Dream Scenario

Here’s the dream tax scenario of this strategy. Because the trust is an
income tax nullity, the parent does not recognize any taxable income on
the sale of the stock to the trust. For income tax purposes, the transaction
is treated as a sale by a person to himself or herself—a nonevent. Under
the same rationale, the interest and principal payments on the installment
note from the trust to the parent trigger no income tax consequences.
Any income recognized by the trust on the stock or other trust assets is
taxed to the parent as the owner of the trust. Ideally, the parent’s sale to
the trust triggers no gift tax consequences because the trust is deemed to
have paid full value for the stock in the form of the installment note.
Similarly, the parent’s payment of income taxes on the trust income will
168. I.R.C. §§ 671–679.
169. Id. § 2036.
170. See id. § 675(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(4) (2007).
171. Estate of Jordahl v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 92, 100 (1975), acq. 1977-2 C.B. 1; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 9227013 (Mar. 30, 1992).
172. See I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(i).
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not trigger a gift tax. When the parent dies, the stock is not included in
the parent’s estate under section 2036(a) because the parent is deemed to
have sold the stock for full consideration. Thus, all future growth in the
value of the transferred stock is removed from the parent’s estate. The
one disadvantage is that the parent’s income tax basis in the stock (often
very low) will probably transfer over to the trust and ultimately to the
children. But even this negative result might be eliminated if the parent,
before death, uses the retained non-fiduciary asset substitution power to
trade high-basis assets (e.g., cash) for the low-basis stock at equal
values, thus ensuring that the reacquired low-basis stock is included in
the parent’s estate at death and thereby receives a full basis step-up. The
trust will still have accomplished its estate tax goal of removing the
growth in the stock’s value from the parent’s estate because the
substituted cash pulled from the estate will equal the higher stock value.
And, once again, no income tax consequences will be triggered on the
substitution because the parent will still be deemed the owner of the trust
for income tax purposes.
b.

Key Question: Will It Work?

There are some aspects of the strategy that seem relatively certain.
First, a retained non-fiduciary power to reacquire trust assets by
substituting other property of equivalent value should make the trust a
grantor trust for income tax purposes.173 Second, such a power, in and of
itself, probably should not trigger estate tax inclusion. To remove any
doubt regarding the estate inclusion issue related to this power, some
recommend giving this non-fiduciary power to a party other than the
grantor.174 Third, no gain or loss will be recognized by the parent on the
sale of appreciated property to a grantor trust in return for a promissory
note that bears a rate of interest equal to the applicable federal rate.175
Fourth, the stock should not be included in the parent’s estate if the
parent dies after the note has been fully paid.176 Finally, the parents’
payment of income taxes on the trust’s income will not trigger a gift

173. See I.R.C. § 675(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(4).
174. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-27-013 (Mar. 30, 1992); Estate of Jordahl v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.
92 (1975).
175. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
176. Because the parent will not be receiving any payments at death, there is no risk of estate tax
inclusion under section 2036(a).
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tax.177
Beyond these relative tax certainties, there are two fundamental
questions that are troubling. First, how will the promissory note be
valued for gift tax purposes? Second, if the parent dies while the note is
outstanding, will the parent be deemed to have retained a life estate in
the stock, such that it will be taxed in the parent’s estate at death? If the
answer to the first question is that the note will be valued in the same
manner as a retained equity interest under section 2701 (fair market
value), a substantial gift tax will be triggered when the stock is
transferred because the applicable federal rate will likely be far below
the market rate needed to give the note a market value equal to the
transferred stock. The net effect will be that the strategy will be no more
effective than a preferred stock freeze under section 2701 because it will
be subject to the same yield challenges. The answer to the second
question turns on the potential application of section 2036(a), which
requires that any property transferred by the decedent during life be
taxed in the decedent’s estate if the decedent owned an income interest
in the property at death.178 If the answer to this second question is “Yes,”
the whole effort will produce no estate tax savings if the parent does not
outlive the note. The existing cases and rulings suggest that the answer
to both questions likely will turn on whether the note will be considered
real debt or rather be viewed as disguised equity.179 This will be a fact
question in each situation. If the only source for payment of the interest
and principal on the note is income generated on the stock owned by the
trust, the equity risk goes way up and the entire transaction is put in
jeopardy.180 For this reason, many sensibly believe that when stock in a
closely held corporation is the asset sold to the trust, the parent would be

177. See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7.
178. See I.R.C. § 2036(a).
179. In Sharon Karmazin, Tax Court Docket 2127-03, the Service took the position that both
2701 and 2702 were applicable because the note was not real debt, but the case was settled. See
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9515039 (Jan. 17, 1995) (real debt only if trustee/obligor has other assets);
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9251004 (section 2036 applied where closely held stock was only source of
note payment and plan was to have trust retain stock for family purposes); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9639012 (June 14, 1996) (no section 2036 inclusion where note would be paid off in three years
from earnings on S corporation stock); Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. M. (CCH) 1220, 1237
(2006) (loans from partnership characterized as retained interests that trigger 2036 inclusion);
Dallas v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 313 (2006) (notes not challenged; trust funded with other asset
that exceeded 10 percent of stock purchase price).
180. See Robert S. Keebler & Peter J. Melcher, Structuring IDGT Sales to Avoid Sections 2701,
2702, and 2036, Estate Planning, Oct. 2005, at 19.
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well advised to transfer other income-producing assets to the trust that
have a value equal to at least one-ninth of the value of the stock.181 Even
with such a transfer of additional assets, there is no guarantee that the
equity risk will be eliminated. Also, the client should understand that an
unfavorable answer to one or both of these critical questions would
probably result if Congress or the Service decided to attack this strategy
(a justifiable fear given the blatant attempt to secure huge tax benefits by
taking advantage of a technical incongruity in the Code).
If the parent dies before the note is paid off, there are a few tax
questions that can only be answered with guesswork at this time. The
trust will cease to be a grantor trust on the parent’s death but will
continue to owe the parent’s estate (or its beneficiaries) payments on the
note. First, will such payments be treated as income in respect of a
decedent under section 691, triggering income to the recipients as paid?
The payments do not fit the technical definition of income in respect of a
decedent,182 but logically it’s difficult to justify income tax-free
treatment to the parent’s heirs. Second, what will be the trust’s basis in
the stock on the parent’s death? The options are: (1) the amount of the
note at time of purchase (a purchase step-up), (2) the fair market value of
the stock at the parent’s death (full basis step-up), or (3) the parent’s
transferred basis in the stock.183 The best guess is the carryover basis
provision of section 1015 because of its technical “transfer in trust”
language and the fact that the whole strategy is predicated on the
theories that there is no sale for income tax purposes (which is
inconsistent with a basis step-up under section 1012) and that the stock
is not part of the grantor’s estate (which makes a step-up under section
1014 a real stretch). But wait, who said anything about being consistent?
Maybe talking out of three sides of the mouth to get a basis step-up will
work. Finally, will the parent’s death before the note is paid off trigger
any taxable gain to the parent’s estate because the trust has ceased to be
a grantor trust? Most think not.184
Often an IDGT is compared to a GRAT. In some respects, they are
181. See id. at 24.
182. Because the parent never treated the sale as a taxable event under the rationale of Rev. Rul.
85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, the post-death payments do not fit the technical definition of “income in
respect of a decent (IRD)” under section 691.
183. I.R.C. §§ 1012, 1014 , 1015.
184. See Laura H. Peebles, Death of an IDIT Noteholder, Trusts & Estates, Aug. 2005, at 28, 29;
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans, & Hugh H. Jacobson, Income Tax Effects of
Termination of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of Grantor’s Death, 97 J. TAX’N 149, 149 (2002).
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close cousins; they both involve a transfer of property to a grantor trust,
followed by the trust making payments to the grantor over a defined
period of time. But in no sense are they twins. There are many key
differences, some of which can be compelling for a family business.
First, a GRAT is specifically authorized by the Code and Regulations; an
IDGT is a quasi-freak creation of an incongruity in the Code that triggers
uncertainties. Thus, a GRAT may be viewed as a “legally safer” option.
Second, a GRAT creates a mortality risk: the grantor must outlive the
GRAT term for the GRAT to produce any transfer tax savings. No such
mortality risk is mandated by an IDGT; ideally only the unpaid portion
of the installment note at the grantor’s death will be taxed in the
grantor’s estate. Third, although both a GRAT and an IDGT impose a
yield risk, the IDGT hurdle rate is presumably easier because the
applicable federal rate, required by the IDGT, is always lower than the
section 7520 rate required for the GRAT. Fourth, the GRAT produces
less valuation discount leveraging benefits because such benefits will be
lost for any stock that is transferred back to the grantor as required
annuity payments. Fifth, the risk of an inadvertent gift or estate tax is
higher with an IDGT because of existing uncertainties regarding the
potential application of Code sections 2701, 2702, and 2036(a). Finally,
although the IDGT will require the commitment of other assets to the
trust to hedge the disguised equity characterization risk of the
installment note, the periodic payment burden of an IDGT often will be
far less than a GRAT because the presumed lack of a mortality risk will
allow the payments on the note to be stretched out over a long term.185
Often when the GRAT and the IDGT are laid side by side in the
planning process, the IDGT will appear the most attractive in spite of its
inherent legal uncertainties and the need for other assets. The presumed
absence of a mortality risk, the lower yield hurdle rate, the greater
discount-leveraging benefits, and the smaller periodic payment burden
will carry the day. But even if the IDGT wins its beauty contest with the
GRAT, it may not be a sensible candidate for many family transition
plans.
c.

Family Business Factors to Consider

The potential benefits of the IDGT cross-purchase strategy are
compelling. A few key factors should be carefully considered before
185. See generally Blattmachr & Zeydel, Comparing GRATs and Installment Sales, Heckerling
Institute on Estate Planning, ch. 2 (2007).
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employing the strategy in a family business transition plan. First, a
threshold issue is whether a cross-purchase of stock funded primarily
with income from the corporation is the best strategy for the family and
the business, given the other transition strategies that are available. If so,
using a grantor trust as the purchaser may be justified. The key is to not
let the allure of the grantor trust strategy short circuit the analysis of
other options that may, in the end, do a better job of accomplishing the
family’s objectives. Obviously, if a grantor trust purchase is used, it will
be easier with S status because the double dividend income tax hit
triggered in C corporation situations is avoided.
A second factor is whether the client has the means and the gifting
capacity to fund the trust with other income-producing assets equal to at
least one-ninth of the value of the stock sold to the trust. If not, the gift
and estate tax risks of the whole effort may just be too much. The
significance of fudging on this protective measure should not be
understated. For many, this requirement will be too burdensome.
Third, if the basis of the parent’s stock is high (such as would occur
on the first death of a spouse in a community property state186), the value
of the strategy is reduced significantly. Compared to a straight crosspurchase with a child, the only real significant benefit of a grantor trust
purchase in such a situation is the tax-free shift of value resulting from
the parent’s payment of income tax on corporate income that would
otherwise be taxed to the child.187 Even this potential benefit is watered
down if the child’s marginal income tax rate is lower than the parent’s
marginal rate, a likely condition in many situations. So the net benefits
of the strategy will be substantially reduced in cross-purchase
transactions targeted to occur after the death of the first parent.
Finally, the client’s capacity to stomach tax uncertainty must be
factored into the mix. The whole strategy is predicated on a technical
incongruity that could be easily eliminated on a retroactive basis. A
vulnerable element of the strategy is the basis of valuing the note for gift
tax purposes. The argument would be that because the transaction is
considered a nullity for income tax purposes, the note should not be
valued against the applicable federal rate standards used to assess
income tax impacts in family loan situations, but rather should be valued
as a retained interest against market standards to access the real gift tax
impacts by comparing the value of the transferred asset (the stock)
186. I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6).
187. See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7.

185

DRAKE-FINAL.DOC

Washington Law Review

6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM

Vol. 83:123, 2008

against the true value of the retained asset (the note). If this were done,
the strategy would trigger a significant gift tax hit (if the rate on the note
equaled the applicable federal rate) or would require that the note rate be
set at a high market rate that would significantly reduce (if not entirely
eliminate) the transfer tax benefits of the entire effort (ala section 2701).
The strategy offers mystery, uncertainty, and a potential dream
ending. Its allure will be irresistible to some, but for many families it
will demand too much and promise too little.
2.

The SCIN⎯A Bet Against Life

The self-canceling installment note (SCIN) is a cross-purchase
enhancement strategy that may produce an additional estate tax benefit if
the parent dies before the note is paid off. The parent sells stock to a
child or a grantor trust in return for a promissory note. The note, by its
terms, provides that all amounts due under the note will be canceled if
the parent dies before the note is paid. The benefit to the obligor on the
note (child or trust) is that the obligation ends on the parent’s death.
From the parent’s perspective, no residual note balance will be included
in the parent’s taxable estate,188 nor will any taxable income in respect of
the decedent be paid to the parent’s estate or heirs.
The key to the SCIN is valuing the self-canceling feature. The
determination of this amount (the Premium) requires an actuarial
calculation that is impacted by the parent’s age, the length of the note
term, and the size of the periodic payments.189 The value of the Premium
must reflect the economic reality of the given situation if, for example,
the parent has a short life expectancy due to poor health.190 If the note
itself is not adjusted for the Premium, the parent will be deemed to have
made a taxable gift equal to the amount of the Premium. This gift tax
impact can be eliminated by increasing either the interest rate or the
principal balance of the note, or both, so that the value of the Premium is
reflected in the terms of the note. If the parent dies before the note is
fully paid, the note is canceled, but the basis in the stock is not

188. See Estate of Moss v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1239, 1247 (1980), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 1; Rev. Rul.
86-72, 1986-1 C.B. 253; Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Frane v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993).
189. Presumably, the Premium calculation could be based on Table H in the Alpha Volume of
the IRS actuarial tables or Table 90CM of such tables.
190. See, e.g., Estate of Musgrove v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 657, 658 (1995).

186

DRAKE-FINAL.DOC

6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM

Transitioning the Family Business
reduced.191 However, any unrealized gain in the note must be included in
the first income tax return of the parent’s estate as income recognized on
the cancellation of an installment obligation under section 453B(f).192
There are some potential disadvantages with a SCIN. If the parent
outlives the note, the strategy will have produced no benefits but will
have triggered added tax costs—the parent’s taxable income and taxable
estate will have been increased by the amount of the Premium or the
parent will be deemed to have made a taxable gift equal to the Premium.
Plus, if the note is adjusted to incorporate the Premium, the purchaser
will have paid more and will have received no tangible economic benefit
in return. Finally, in situations where multiple children are beneficiaries
of the estate, a self-canceling note in favor of only one child may
conflict with the parents’ overriding objective to give each child an
equal share of the estate.
The forgoing discussion of gifting, redemption and cross purchase
strategies assumes a need for the parents to rid themselves of their stock.
Often this is necessary and desirable to reduce future estate tax burdens,
to provide a secure retirement income stream to the parents, and to
provide the children with the necessary incentives to carry the business
forward. But there are circumstances where the business can be
restructured to facilitate these essential family objectives without the
parents having to aggressively sell stock. Such a restructuring may allow
the parents to phase-out without selling out.
D.

Business Restructuring⎯Phase-Out Options

Often some simple business restructuring can help immensely in the
design of a family transition plan. Suppose, for example, that Wilson
Incorporated is restructured to take advantage of two basic realities.
First, the distribution of S corporation earnings presents no double tax
issues.193 Second, Jeff’s desire to expand into new markets and to garner
all of the benefits of expansion for himself can be accomplished by
having him form and operate a new business that finances the expansion,

191. Estate of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 998 F.2d 567
(8th Cir. 1993).
192. I.R.C §§ 453B(f), 691(a)(5)(A)(iii) (2006); Estate of Frane, 98 T.C. 341.
193. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1). If the distributions exceed the S corporation’s accumulated adjustment
account, a taxable dividend exposure remains to the extent of the corporation’s earnings and profits
from its C corporation existence. Id. § 1368(c)(2). The exposure ends once the earnings and profits
have been distributed.
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takes the risks of expansion, and realizes all of the benefits. The
restructuring may be implemented as follows:
• Wilson Inc. would make an S election. The stockholders of the
company would remain the same, at least for the time being. Earl and
Betty would keep their stock for now. Earl would make plans to retire
and ride off with Betty.
• The company would either employ Jeff as its CEO, or it would
contract with the new company to be formed by Jeff (described below)
to provide top-level management for the company. The compensation
structure would be designed to provide attractive bonus incentives to Jeff
if the income of the company is improved under the new management. It
may include deferred compensation tied to increases in the value of the
company’s stock.
• Jeff would form a new company. This new company would be
structured to finance and manage the growth and expansion of the
business. It would take the risks; it would reap the benefits. Appropriate
provisions would be drawn to ensure that the new company does not
adversely effect Wilson Inc.’s present operation, but that it has the
latitude to enhance the existing markets and expand into new markets.
Preferably, the new company would be a pass-through entity⎯an S
corporation or a limited liability company. Jeff would select the entity
form that works best for him.
• Earl and Betty would structure a gifting program to transfer to
their children Wilson S corporation stock and possibly other assets if and
when they determine that they have sufficient assets and income to meet
their future needs. These gifts, when made, would be planned to
maximize use of their annual gift tax exclusions and the unused gift tax
unified credits of Earl and Betty.
• Earl and Betty’s wills or living trust would be structured to leave
each child an equal share of their estate. Jeff would have a preferred
claim to the Wilson S stock, and Kathy and Paul would have a priority
claim to the other assets in the estate. If it becomes necessary to pass
some of the Wilson stock to Kathy and Paul to equalize the values, the
will or living trust would include buy-sell provisions that would give
Jeff the right to buy the Wilson stock passing to Kathy and Paul under
stated terms and conditions. Jeff’s management rights would remain
protected by the existing employment or management contracts.
This simple restructuring would offer a number of potential benefits.
First, because Earl and Betty would retain their stock, they would have
an income for life, and, if that income grew beyond their needs, they
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would have the flexibility to begin transferring stock (and the related
income) to their children and grandchildren as they chose. Because the
cash distributions would be stock-related distributions, the unreasonable
compensation risk would be eliminated, as would any payroll tax
burdens. Second, by virtue of the S election, the income distributed to
Earl and Betty each year would be pre-tax earnings, free of any threat of
double taxation. As long as the corporation had sufficient current
earnings, this income would be taxed only once. No longer would a
party be forced to make payments with after-tax dollars to another
family member. Third, Jeff’s management and control rights would be
protected by the employment and management agreements. Earl could
play as much or as little of a role in the business as he chose. The parties
could sculpt their control and management agreement in any manner that
they chose, free of any tax restrictions or limitations. Fourth, Jeff would
be the primary beneficiary of the future growth in the business through
the new business entity. The operating lines between the old company
and the new company would need to be clearly defined. The goal would
be to preserve the existing business operation for the old company and
its shareholders (principally Earl and Betty) and to allow any new
operations and opportunities to grow in the company that would be
owned, financed, and operated by Jeff. Fifth, stock owned by Earl and
Betty at their deaths would receive a full step-up in income tax basis.194
Sixth, future increases in the value of Earl and Betty’s estate could be
limited and controlled by (1) the incentive employment and management
contracts with Jeff; (2) the new company owned, financed, and operated
by Jeff; and (3) a controlled gifting program implemented by Earl and
Betty. Finally, hopefully the income stream for Earl and Betty would be
insulated from some or all of the financing risks taken by Jeff to expand
into new markets. These financing risks would be in the new company,
not the old company.
There are limitations and potential disadvantages with such a
restructuring approach that would need to be carefully evaluated and
may require some creative solutions. First, Jeff may need the operating
and asset base of Wilson Inc. to finance the expansion efforts. Various
factors may influence this issue, including historical success patterns, the
likelihood of future success, Jeff’s track record and expertise, and other
assets owned by Jeff. If this condition exists, it may significantly
complicate the situation. Workable alternatives usually are available,
194. Id. § 1014(a)(1).
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depending on the flexibility of the lenders and Earl and Betty’s
willingness to take some risk to help with the financing. But clearly this
can be a troubling complication.
The second potential disadvantage is the possibility that the value of
Earl and Betty’s common stock in the old company may continue to
grow, with a corresponding increase in their estate tax exposure. There
would be no automatic governor on the stock’s future growth in value.
Hopefully, this growth fear could be mitigated or entirely eliminated
with a carefully implemented gifting program, the operation of Jeff’s
new company, and special incentives under the employment or
management agreements.
A third potential disadvantage is that the employment or management
contracts for Jeff would be subject to a special provision in Section
1366(e) of the Code that requires that a family member who renders
services to an S corporation be paid reasonable compensation for those
services.195 Presumably, this requirement would not be a problem
because the goal would be to adequately compensate Jeff and to provide
him with attractive economic incentives to preserve the existing
operations for the security of Earl and Betty.
Fourth, conversion to S corporation status likely would create
additional tax challenges that usually are regarded as serious nuisances,
not reasons for rejecting the strategy. These challenges are discussed in
Section III.C. above. An immediate tax hit will be triggered if the
company values its inventory under the LIFO method.196 Additional
taxes may be incurred in the future if shareholder distributions from the
S corporation exceed earnings during the S period,197 if assets owned by
the S corporation at time of conversion are sold within the 10-year
period following the conversion,198 or if the net passive income received
by the S corporation exceeds 25 percent of its receipts during a period
that it has accumulated earnings and profits from its C existence.199
Usually, these tax risks of conversion can be reduced to acceptable
levels or eliminated entirely with careful monitoring and planning.
The plan design process should include an evaluation of business
restructuring options that address specific family objectives. This may

195. Id. § 1366(e).
196. Id. § 1363(d).
197. Id. § 1368(c)(2).
198. See generally id. § 1374.
199. See generally id. §§ 1375, 1362(d)(3).
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allow the parents to rethink or slow down their stock transitions or to
target the transitions to occur at key times, such as the death of the first
parent. Although the tax challenges of a stock redemption require a
complete disposition of the parents’ stock, gifting and cross-purchase
options may be implemented on a piecemeal basis to complement the
business restructuring and to flexibly accommodate changed
circumstances.
V.

THE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP OR LLC⎯A COMPANION
PLAY

Many family business owners want financial and estate plans that
protect assets, preserve control, and save taxes. Perhaps no planning
tools historically have been more effective in meeting these basic family
objectives than the family partnership and the family limited liability
company (“LLC”). These are flexible tools that can be crafted to
accomplish specific, targeted objectives, including shifting income to
other family members, maximizing wealth scattering gifting
opportunities, protecting assets from creditors, and (the one that really
drives the Service crazy) creating valuation discounts in the parents’
estate by repackaging investment assets into discounted limited
partnership interests. The wise use of a family partnership often can
boost the performance of other planning tools, such as children and
grandchildren trusts, dynasty trusts, and structured gifting programs.
If the family business is operated in corporate form, as most are, the
family partnership or LLC usually will not be a vehicle for directly
transitioning the stock of the corporation. A partnership or LLC may not
own stock of an S corporation. And although stock of a closely held
family C corporation could be contributed to a partnership or LLC, the
benefits of doing so are highly questionable. There are three compelling
tax problems. First, any earnings of the C corporation distributed as
dividends to the shareholders, including the partnership, will be subject
to both a corporate level tax hit and a shareholder dividend tax hit. This
double tax burden eliminates the pass-through income benefits that
partnership-taxed entities typically enjoy and will increase the expense
and hassle of trying to use the partnership vehicle to shift income to
other family members. Second, all losses generated by the C corporation
will be trapped inside the corporation and will not pass through to its
shareholders. Thus, the typical loss pass-through benefits of a
partnership will not exist. Third, and of far greater concern, there is a
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high risk that section 2036(a) would be applied to deny the parents the
benefits of any valuation discounts that they may seek to claim as a
result of the partnership structure. As discussed in Section E.2. below,
section 2036(a) has been the most potent weapon used by the Service in
racking up a series of victories against family partnerships in cases
where the family has been unable to prove a legitimate and significant
non-tax reason for the partnership.200 If stock of a closely held family C
corporation was transferred to a partnership in hopes of securing any
valuation discount benefits on the death of a parent, a compelling
argument could be made that the partnership served no legitimate and
significant nontax purpose because the partnership simply held stock in a
closely controlled family corporation, never functioned as a business
enterprise, never engaged in any meaningful business activities, did not
provide any additional limited liability or significant asset protection
benefits, and was nothing more than a “recycling” vehicle motivated
entirely by tax considerations. This was the reasoning that the Service
argued and the Tax Court adopted in Estate of Bongard v.
Commissioner,201 a 2005 case where section 2036(a) was applied to tax
the decedent’s estate interests in a limited liability company that had
been transferred to a family limited partnership and thereby denied any
valuation discounts claimed with respect to the partnership.
The formidable obstacles of using a family partnership or LLC to
transition stock in a family corporation does not preclude such
partnership or LLC from being part of the transition plan in many cases.
If the family business is operated in a partnership or LLC or as a sole
proprietorship, use of a partnership or LLC as the primary transition
vehicle is a given. But in the great bulk of cases, those where the family
business is conducted in a C or S corporation, the family partnership or
LLC will serve a companion or supplemental transition strategy for
valuable assets held outside the corporation that are ultimately targeted
for those children who do not have career ties to the business. For
example, in our case study Earl and Betty could form a limited
partnership and transfer the real property that houses the business to the
200. Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (2006); Estate of Rector v. Comm’r,
T.C.M. (RIA) 1955 (2007); Estate of Erickson v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 757 (2007); Estate of
Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir.
2005); Estate of Hillgren v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (2004); Kimbell v. United States, 371
F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Estate of
Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95 (2005).
201. 124 T.C. 95 (2005).

192

DRAKE-FINAL.DOC

6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM

Transitioning the Family Business
partnership in return for limited partnership units. Kathy and Paul, the
outside children, would transfer other assets to a newly formed S
corporation that they would own and control. The S corporation, in turn,
would transfer its newly acquired assets to the partnership in return for
general partner units. The S corporation, owned by Kathy and Paul,
would be the sole general partner and have complete management
authority of the partnership, and Earl and Betty would start out as the
sole limited partners of the partnership. With this tiered structure, all
parties would have limited liability protection for the activities of the
partnership. Earl and Betty, the retiring parents, would be relieved of the
burden of having to manage the real estate and negotiate with Jeff on
matters related to the company’s use of the real estate. Kathy and Paul,
the children targeted to ultimately own the real estate with their families,
would directly manage and control all issues relating to the real estate.
This partnership structure may provide some valuable tax saving
opportunities. Earl and Betty could maximize the use of their annual gift
tax exclusions and unified credits by transferring limited partnership
units each year to their children and to trusts established for their
grandchildren.202 Because the limited partnership units have no control
rights, the units would qualify for substantial lack of marketability and
minority interest discounts. Lower values would permit more units to be
gifted within the dollar limitations of the annual gift tax exclusion and
unified credits. The gifts would not deplete Earl and Betty’s more liquid
investment assets, nor would they dilute the control rights vested in
Kathy and Paul. As the gifts are made, the gifted units would be
removed from Earl and Betty’s taxable estates, and all distribution rights
and income attributable to the gifted units would be shifted and taxed to
other family members. Plus, any limited partnership units remaining in
Earl and Betty’s estates at death also may qualify for substantial lack of
marketability and minority interest discounts because those units would
have no control rights.
The potential to generate these valuation discounts makes the family
partnership an attractive candidate in many transition plans. In 1959, the

202. For grandchildren under age 21, simple 2503(c) trusts can be used to avoid future interest
characterizations that would otherwise compromise the availability of the annual gift tax exclusion.
I.R.C. § 2503(c). Plus, care should be taken to ensure that the each grandchild’s trust is structured to
avoid the generation skipping tax by having an inclusion ratio of zero. Id. § 2642(c)(2). Generally,
this will require that the grandchild be the sole beneficiary during his or her life, and that the trust
assets be included in the grandchild’s estate if the grandchild dies before the trust terminates.
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Service issued Revenue Ruling 59-60,203 which set forth guidelines to be
used in valuing the stock of a closely held corporation. Years later, in
Revenue Ruling 68-609,204 the Service stated that the valuation
principles of 59-60 also would apply to partnership interests. The two
most significant discounts associated with a minority interest in a closely
held business enterprise are the minority interest (lack of control)
discount and the lack of marketability discount. In devising a discount
strategy for a family partnership, it helps to keep in mind differences
between a partnership interest and stock in a closely held corporation.
Both state law and the partnership agreement govern a partner’s rights in
a partnership, and it is not uncommon for both of these to impose
substantial transfer restrictions. However, as discussed below, in
devising a discount strategy, it is advisable to consider only state law
restrictions.
The powerful tax benefits of family partnerships and LLCs have made
them a popular target of the Service. The heat has been turned up over
the last ten years as the Service has pulled out all the stops to shut down
techniques that are designed to produce extreme tax savings. Some
courts, including the Tax Court, have been willing accomplices on a few
occasions. Key uncertainties still loom. Unfortunately, the thrust of the
fighting has made everything harder. This is not to suggest that the
family partnership or LLC is doomed as a planning tool or is only suited
for those who have a cast-iron stomach and the will to invite an
encounter with the government. What it does confirm is the importance
of careful attention to detail, reasonable expectations, and a willingness
to not push the evolving limits. Below is a review of some of the key
elements that should be carefully evaluated in the design of any plan that
incorporates a family partnership or LLC. Although the discussion
continually references a “family partnership,” the issues are the same for
any family LLC that is taxed as a partnership.
A.

The “Real Partner” Requirement

A family member will be deemed to be a partner for income tax
purposes only if that individual is determined to be a “real partner,”
which requires that the transaction vest the family member with
dominion and control over the partnership interest.205 The Service has
203. Rev. Rul. 59-60 1959-1 C.B. 237.
204. Rev. Rul. 68-609 1968-2 C.B. 327.
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii) (2006).
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established a number of guidelines for determining whether a particular
family member is a “real partner.”206 No single guideline will determine
whether a particular partner passes or fails the test. All factors need to be
considered. Usually there is not a serious problem, but care should be
taken in structuring the partnership or LLC agreement to ensure that it
does not contain any one of a number of weird or unusual features.
Following is a brief description of certain risky provisions that should be
avoided in drawing the partnership agreement:
1. The partnership agreement should never state that there will be no
cash distributions or that a particular partner will not receive any cash
distributions. The family member who is precluded from participating in
cash distributions likely will not be considered a real partner.207
Generally, it is advisable to state in the partnership agreement that all
cash in excess of the operating needs of the partnership will be
distributed. If there is a need for the partnership to accumulate funds for
a specific purpose, that need should be carefully documented from time
to time.
2. Generally, it is not advisable to preclude a general partner from
participating in the management of the partnership. That individual may
not be considered a “real partner.”208 The use of a limited partnership to
preclude any control by limited partners, in and of itself, will not create a
problem.209 For this reason, it is generally advisable to use the limited
partnership format when there is a desire to preclude certain family
members from participating in the management.
3. A family partnership agreement should not contain severe buy-sell
restrictions that prevent a partner from disposing of his or her interest in
the partnership. Such provisions may preclude the partner from being
considered a “real owner” for tax purposes.210 The buy-sell provisions in
the agreement may provide that, if a partner desires to dispose of his or
her interest in the partnership, the other partners will have a first right to
acquire such interest and other rights associated with the disposition of
such interests. The key is not to be too strict in controlling the transfer of
family partnership interests.
4. It is never advisable to allow minors to directly own interests in the

206. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2).
207. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(a).
208. Id. §§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(d), 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix).
209. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix).
210. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(c).
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partnership. Minors usually do not have the legal business capacity to
protect themselves and may not be regarded as “real partners” for tax
purposes.211 A minor child’s partnership interest should be held in a trust
for the minor, held by a guardian, or held by a custodian under the
applicable Uniform Transfer to Minors Act.
B.

Most Suitable Assets

Families often have flexibility in selecting the assets that will be
transferred to a family partnership. Following are a few key points to
keep in mind in selecting the best assets in a given situation:
1. Investments that generate income based on services rendered by a
family member are completely inappropriate for a family partnership. As
discussed below, the family partnership rule of section 704(e) generally
requires that capital, as distinguished from personal services or labor,
must be a material income-producing factor in the partnership.212
2. The stock of an S corporation should never be transferred to a
family partnership. A partnership is not a qualified shareholder of an S
corporation.213 Any such transfer to a partnership will destroy the S
election for the corporation.
3. Property that is expected to depreciate in value is not a good
candidate for a family limited partnership. In most situations, gift
transfers of partnership units to other family members will be sheltered
from the gift tax through the use of the annual gift tax exclusion or
through consumption of the parents’ unified credits. If the property
depreciates following the transfer, all or a portion of these gift tax
benefits will have been wasted.
4. Usually, it is not advisable to transfer to a family partnership assets
that are expected to generate income tax losses for a period of time. In
most situations, the parents will want to retain such assets in order to
enjoy the write-offs.
5. Great care should be taken in transferring to a partnership real
estate and other assets that are subject to a mortgage or other
indebtedness. The transfer itself may trigger creditor’s rights under a due
on sale clause or require some form of special consent from the lender.

211. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(vii).
212. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv).
213. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B).
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C.

Income Shifting Limitations

When partnership units are transferred to another family member, the
income allocated to those units flows to that other family member. But
there is a trap that should be watched whenever a family partnership is
used to shift income among family members. The trap, found in Section
704(e) of the Code, can eliminate or dilute the income shifting
advantage.214 Four requirements must be satisfied to avoid the trap.215
1. Capital, as distinguished from personal services, must be a material
income-producing factor in the partnership.216 The capital can be in the
form of tangible or intangible assets. Capital is not an income-producing
factor when the partnership’s income consists principally of fees,
commissions, or other compensation for personal services. If the income
is from investment assets or a business that requires substantial
inventories or substantial investments in plant, machinery, or other
equipment, this requirement usually will not be an issue.217
2. The partnership must be structured so that each partner really owns
his or her capital interest—has dominion and control over the interest.
This is the “real partner” requirement previously discussed. A limited
partnership structure itself will not cause a problem under this “real
partner” requirement.218 Make certain that none of the unusual or weird
provisions referenced above are included in the partnership agreement.
3. The donors, usually the parents, must be adequately compensated
for services that they render to the partnership. If, for example, a parent
works for a business that is owned by the partnership, the parent must be
paid reasonable compensation for the services actually rendered.219 If the
parent is not fairly compensated, the trap kicks in to deny any allocation
of the parent’s service-related income to the children.
4. The partnership agreement may not allocate to the donee partners
214. The section 704(e) provisions are not exclusive and do not provide a safe harbor against
general assignment of income principles that may be applied to reallocate income among family
members in extreme situations. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(i)(b). See Woodbury v. Comm’r, 49 T.C.
180 (1967).
215. Section 704(e) applies to all gifts, including those made to non-family members. Plus, any
partnership interest acquired by purchase from a family member is considered a gift for purposes of
the section 704(e) provisions. I.R.C. § 704(e)(2) (2006). Family members include one’s spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendents, and any trusts for the primary benefit of such persons.
216. Id. § 704(e)(1).
217. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(iv).
218. Id. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix).
219. I.R.C. § 704(e)(2).
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(the children or grandchildren trusts) an interest in the partnership’s
income that is greater than their respective interests in the partnership’s
capital.220 This requirement prohibits the use of special allocations that
have the effect of allocating disproportionately large income shares to
the donee children. The partnership income allocated to any donee
should be proportionate to the capital owned by the donee. Some
advisors question whether this requirement precludes special allocations
of deductions within a family partnership agreement (i.e. depreciation
deductions) that otherwise meet the requirements of section 704(b) and
that have the indirect effect of allocating a proportionately larger share
of the partnership’s income to the donee children.221 The safest and
wisest approach is to assume that this requirement prohibits any such
special allocations.222
D.

Creditor Protection Benefits.

A family limited partnership, if properly structured and funded, can
become a nuisance for judgment creditors. In most states, a judgment
creditor is limited to obtaining a charging order against the partnership
units and then petitioning to have the charging order “liquidated.”223 The
charging order gives the creditor the right to receive income from the
partnership when and if the income is distributed. It does not give the
creditor the right to control or gain access to the assets that are actually
held by the partnership.224 The liquidation enables the creditor to become
the owner of the limited partnership interest, but gives the creditor no
access to the partnership property, no voting control or power, and no
power to compel cash distributions. The nuisance factor of the limited
partnership can be enhanced by transferring partnership units to other
family members or to trusts strategically organized in states that have
asset protection statutes or in select foreign countries. A combination of
220. Id. § 704(e)(2).
221. See WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMORE, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS § 15.05[1][c] (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the issue and
concluding that the section 704(e) limitations should trump any 704(b) allocation).
222. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(iii).
223. See REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7.03 (1976).
224. The creditors’ rights are those of a transferee, which are limited to the partner’s right to
receive distributions from the partnership. See section 7.02 of the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act. For a description of the practical impacts of a charging order and how it often
yields “little or nothing,” see Author’s Comments 8 & 9 of Section 504 or the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act.
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steps can be taken to create a number of obstacles that may discourage
any creditor.
There is one additional aspect of the limited partnership device that
makes it an even greater nuisance for the judgment creditor. Based on
Revenue Ruling 77-137,225 if a creditor secures a charging order against
the partnership units, there is a high probability that the creditor will be
taxed on its share of the partnership income as the owner of the units. If
that income is retained in the partnership, the creditor may end up
having to book phantom income for tax purposes. In effect, the charging
order may become a poison pill for the creditor. If the creditor becomes
a limited partner by having the charging order liquidated, there is little
question that the income, phantom or real, will be taxed to the creditor.
E.

IRS Attacks on Family Partnerships

Since the early 1990s, the IRS has used a variety of theories to attack
the tax benefits of family limited partnerships. For simplistic purposes,
these theories are lumped here into three categories.
The first category is the rejected theories. In the 1990s, the Service
issued a host of Technical Advice Memorandums that denied valuation
discounts on the theory that a family partnership was a sham
transaction.226 The theory was a loser in court, and the Service threw in
the towel on the theory when, after a string of losses, the tax court
awarded attorneys fees to an estate that was forced to defend against the
theory.227 The Service also has unsuccessfully argued that section 2703
(the Chapter 14 valuation provision for transfer restrictions) requires that
partnership law restrictions should be disregarded in valuing transfers of
property to limited partnerships and transfers of limited partnership
interests.228 Finally, the Service has futilely advanced a “gift on
creation” argument, based on the theory that the excess of the value of
the property contributed to a limited partnership over the discounted
value of the partnership interest received in return constitutes a gift from
225. Rev. Rul. 1977-1 C.B. 178.
226. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-36-004 (June 6, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-35-003 (May
8, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-30-004 (Apr. 3, 1997); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-25-002
(Mar. 3, 1997).
227. Estate of Dailey v. Comm’r, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) 1816, 1818 (2002). See also Estate of
Thompson v. Comm’r, 246 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (2002); Knight v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 506 (2000).
228. See Church v. United States, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-804 (W.D. Texas 2000), aff’d, 268 F.3d
1063 (5th Cir. 2001); Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 478, 448–89 (2000), aff’d, 293 F.3d
279 (5th Cir. 2002).
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the contributing partner to the other partners. This theory, like the other
two, has gone nowhere in the courts.229
The second theory category is the traps. These have some substance,
but can be easily avoided with some simple planning. These are traps for
the uninformed. The first is the application of the valuation limitations of
section 2704(a) for lapsed voting or liquidation rights in the partnership
agreement.230 The key is to ensure that no person has the unilateral right
to dissolve the partnership, that the death of a general partner will not
dissolve the partnership, and that distributions must be made in cash out
of the cash flow of the partnership (no in-kind distributions). The second
is the application of the valuations limitations of section 2703 (the
Chapter 14 valuation provision for transfer restrictions) to deny the
valuation impact of restrictions in a partnership agreement to the extent
that they exceed state law restrictions. To date, one district court has
bought the theory.231 What this means, as a practical matter, is that the
discount valuation appraisals should specifically identify discounts
based solely on state law restrictions, which in most cases will do the
job. Finally, if a partner makes an additional contribution to a family
partnership and receives no additional partnership interests, the Service
will argue (successfully) that the contribution is an indirect gift to the
other partners.232 The planning point is to ensure that additional
partnership interests are issued to any partner who contributes property
to the partnership.
The third category is the scary theories. These theories potentially
have real teeth in select situations and, if sustained, can undermine the
value of the entire effort. The first relates to the denial of the annual gift
tax exclusion on the gift of family limited partnership interests. The
second relates to the application of section 2036(a) (the retained interest
estate tax provision) to bring the value of the transferred partnership
property back into the taxpayer’s estate. These theories need to be
carefully evaluated in each situation.

229. See Church, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-804; Strangi, 115 T.C. at 490–93.
230. I.R.C. § 2704(a) (2006). Under this section, certain lapses in voting and liquidations rights
are treated as transfers for gift and estate tax purposes by the persons holding the rights. The holder
of the right and his or her family members must control the partnership both before and after the
lapse in order for the section to apply. Id. § 2704(a)(1). Any interest that is held directly or
indirectly may fall within the scope of section 2704. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-1(a)(2) (2007).
231. Smith v. Comm’r, 94 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-5627 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
232. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2002-12-006 (Nov. 20, 2001); Shepherd v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 376,
388–90 (2000), aff’d, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002).

200

DRAKE-FINAL.DOC

6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM

Transitioning the Family Business
1.

Family Partnership Interests and the Annual Gift Tax Exclusion

The gift tax annual exclusion is applicable only to transfers of a
present interest, not future interest transfers.233 The Service has
previously ruled that the transfer of a limited partnership interest would
qualify as a gift of a present interest by virtue of the general partner’s
fiduciary duty to the limited partners and the limited partner’s right to
sell or assign the interest.234 In 1997, the Service denied the annual
exclusion (and found no present interest) in a case where the partnership
agreement gave the general partner unlimited discretion over
distributions (“for any reason whatsoever”) and effectively prohibited
the limited partners from assigning their interests.235
This was followed in 2002 by Hackl v. Commisioner,236 where the
Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit held that no present interest was
transferred on gifts to forty-one donees where, among other things, the
LLC would not produce any cash flow for many years and the donor, as
the manager of the LLC, had control of all cash flow distributions, had
the power to appoint his successor, had approval rights over any
member’s withdrawal, and had consent rights in his “absolute
discretion” over any member interest sales. The court held that a transfer
of an interest in a business entity did not automatically qualify as a
present interest. A present interest would exist, according to the Tax
Court, only if the donee received “an unrestricted and noncontingent
right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment” of the transferred
property or income from the property.237 Unfortunately, neither the Tax
Court nor the Seventh Circuit opinions clarify much for planning
purposes. Surely, there is no requirement that the property be incomeproducing in order for the interest to qualify as a present interest if the
donee has the power to sell the interest. And will the right to assign the
interest suffice if the transferee has no right to become a substitute
member or partner?
For planning purposes, what is clear is that, at a minimum, care
should be exercised to spell out an objective standard for cash
distributions, the general partner’s fiduciary duty with respect to
233. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
234. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-007 (Jan. 12, 1994); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-31-006 (Apr.
30, 1991).
235. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-51-003 (Aug. 28, 1997).
236. 118 T.C. 279 (2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2003).
237. Id. at 293.
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distributions, and the rights of partners to transfer or assign their
interests subject only to a right of first refusal. As an added precaution,
some believe that a partner’s transfer rights should include the absolute
right of the purchaser to become a substitute partner or member. In those
situations where no income will be generated for a period of time and
there is no market for the interests (a common scenario), an added
precaution would be to offer the donee a Crummey-type withdrawal
right for a limited period of time after the gift to strengthen the present
interest argument.238 The entity would agree to buy back the interest for
a limited period of time for its fair market value and would be authorized
to borrow funds to finance any such purchase. All the normal Crummey
procedures would be followed. It might make sense in select situations.
2.

Partnership Donor’s Status Under Section 2036(a)

Section 2036(a) requires that a decedent’s estate include any property
transferred by the decedent during life if the decedent retains (1) the
possession or enjoyment of the property or the income from the property
or (2) the right (alone or in conjunction with others) to designate the
persons who would enjoy the property. There is an exception that makes
the provision inapplicable if the transfer is a bona fide sale for adequate
and full consideration.239 This provision is now the Service’s most
effective weapon against “bad fact” family partnership situations. It has
been used recently to string together a series of victories against
taxpayers who have pushed the limits.240 If section 2036(a) is deemed to
apply, the property transferred to the partnership is brought back into the
decedent’s estate for estate tax purposes and any gift tax exclusions and
credits used in connection with gifts of limited partnership interests will
have been wasted.
The starting point in the analysis is the exception. For it to apply so
that section 2036 is rendered moot, there must be a “bona fide sale” and
“full consideration.” In the context of a family limited partnership, the
238. N. Choate, Leimberg, Estate Planning Newsletter (April 4, 2002). For a brief description of
Crummey withdrawal rights, see supra note 65.
239. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (2006).
240. Estate of Rosen v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220 (2006); Rector Estate v. Comm’r, 2007
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2007 367; Estate of Erickson v. Comm’r, 2007 T.C.M. (RIA) 2007, 107; Estate of
Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir.
2005); Estate of Hillgren v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008 (2004); Kimbell v. United States, 371
F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004); Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Estate of
Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95 (2005).
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Tax Court and the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have held
that the “bona fide sale” condition will exist if, as an objective matter,
the transfer of property to the partnership serves a “substantial business
or other non tax purpose.”241 Subjective intentions of the parties will not
suffice. Nor will non-tax purposes that are factually implausible or not
supported by objective evidence. It is a factual issue that ultimately turns
on whether the partnership has a bona fide business purpose or is just a
vehicle to recycle the taxpayer’s wealth in hopes of securing big tax
valuation discounts. Negative factors include the taxpayer’s ongoing
financial dependence on income from the partnership’s property, the
transfer of substantially all the decedent’s assets to the partnership, the
commingling of personal and business assets, the failure to observe
partnership formalities, the failure of the partnership to conduct any
business activities, the transfer of only passive investments to the
partnership, and the lack of any business rationale to support a plausible
hypothesis that the partnership’s operations will produce an economic
benefit at least as great as the claimed value loss triggered by the
contributions to the partnership.242
If the “bona fide sale” condition is satisfied, the “full consideration”
condition usually will be met if all corporate formalities are respected
and, in exchange for the property transfer to partnership, the taxpayer
receives a proportional interest in the partnership.243 Thus, as a practical
matter, the presence of a legitimate non-tax business purpose is the key
to both requirements. If both requirements are satisfied, the transfer of
property to the partnership will not trigger the application of section
2036.
If the exception does not apply for any reason, the issue becomes
whether the taxpayer retained a “substantial economic benefit” from the
property within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1). This requires an
express or implied agreement that the taxpayer will retain possession or
enjoyment of the property transferred to the partnership.244 It too is a
factual issue that usually turns on whether the evidence supports the
existence of an implied understanding or assurance that the partnership
assets would remain available to meet the personal needs of the
241. See supra note 231.
242. Id.; see also Estate of Harper v. Comm’r, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2000, 202.
243. Strangi, 417 F.3d 468; Kimbell., 371 F.3d 257.
244. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (2007); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); Estate of
Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); Rosen, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220; Strangi, 417
F.3d 468.
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taxpayer. Examples of negative facts include: partnership distributions to
pay personal expenses; the taxpayer’s free use of partnership property
(i.e. a residence); the taxpayer’s inability to support himself or herself
after transfers to the partnership; the commingling of personal and
partnership assets; the failure to maintain partnership capital accounts or
observe other formalities; the absence or waiver of fiduciary duties
relating to partnership distributions; partnership decisions based on the
personal needs of the taxpayer; the taxpayer’s right to change a general
partner who is not subject to fiduciary duties; the taxpayer’s power to
liquidate the partnership; the taxpayer’s power to control the income
flow to the partnership; the use of partnership property to secure debts of
the taxpayer; disproportionate distributions to the taxpayer; and payment
of excessive management fees to the taxpayer.245 The bottom line is that
the taxpayer must be in a position to show that the partnership operates
as a business in accordance with sound business practices and not as a
personal tool of the taxpayer.
Even if the taxpayer is not deemed to have retained a substantial
economic benefit, there may still be a problem under section 2036 if the
taxpayer is deemed to have retained the right to designate the persons
who could enjoy the property within the meaning of section 2036(a)(2).
The application of this provision to a family limited partnership is
unclear, at best. The few cases that have considered the issue involved
extreme facts where the taxpayer had broad discretion to distribute
income free of any fiduciary restraints or broad powers to remove or
replace general partners or liquidate the partnership.246 Nevertheless,
some of the dicta in these cases suggest that this provision could prove
troublesome even in more vanilla scenarios where the taxpayer owns a
substantial interest in the general partnership. Some (including myself)
do not believe the provision should apply in such situations so long as
there is an objective standard for making distributions, the taxpayer is
subject to normal general partner fiduciary duties, and the taxpayer
possesses no special rights to liquidate the partnership or access
partnership assets. Additional precautions may include vesting
distribution decisions in a general partner who is not the taxpayer or
245. Strangi, 417 F.3d 468; Estate of Hillgren, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1008; Kimbell, 371 F.3d 257;
Thompson, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Bongard, 124 T.C. 95; Bigelow, 503 F.3d 955; Rosen, 91
T.C.M. (CCH) 1220.
246. Strangi v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003), aff’d on other grounds, 417 F.3d 468
(5th Cir. 2005); Kimbell v. Comm’r, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003), rev’d on other grounds,
371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004).
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having the taxpayer own no interest in the general partnership.247
The uncertainty associated with section 2036(a)(2) is particularly
disturbing in those common scenarios where limited partnership interests
are gifted. Such gifts will never fall within the “bona fide sale”
exception, but generally should not present a retained economic benefit
problem under section 2036(a)(1) if there is no evidence suggesting that
the taxpayer retained any right to enjoy the transferred partnership
interest or the partnership assets attributable to the interest. Whether the
right “to designate” prohibition can be extended to snare common, nonabusive uses of the family limited partnership is yet to be determined.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provision’s application to
trusts in the famed case of United States v. Byrum,248 coupled with the
fact that the issue has surfaced only in factually “bad fact” difficult
family partnership cases that have raised all the section 2036 issues,
suggest that the provision should not be applied in such a broad fashion.
F.

The Family Partnership “Freeze”

Great care should be exercised in the design of any transition plan that
may include a family partnership freeze transaction where fixed
preferred partnership interests are retained by the parent and growth
partnership interests are transferred to the children. This freeze structure
is the partnership equivalent of the corporate preferred stock freeze
discussed in section IV.A.4 above. The only difference is that the
preferred equity interest is offered in a partnership context and thus
avoids the double income tax burdens of preferred stock. Like the
preferred stock freeze, the gift tax impacts of the structure are governed
by section 2701. That section requires that the value of the preferred
interest retained by the parents be based on the fair market value of a
fixed cumulative rate of return on such preferred interest,249 and that the
subtraction method be used to determine the corresponding value of the
growth interest for gift tax purposes.250 Plus, the same 10 percent
minimum value of the growth interest transferred to the children is

247. See generally Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A Critical Analysis and
Planning Suggestions, 100 TAX NOTES 1153 (Sept. 1, 2003); Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of
Disappearing Wealth Revisited: Using Family Limited Partnerships to Reduce Estate and Gift Tax,
1 PITT. TAX REV. 155 (2004).
248. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
249. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3)(A), (c)(3) (2006).
250. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2701-1(a)(2), 25.2701-3 (2007).
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applicable.251
The section 2701 limitations are an insurmountable barrier in many
situations. Often the fair market value of the preferred interest retained
by the parents (which is set by appraisal) will have a value equal its face
value only if the fixed distribution rate on such preferred interest is set at
a level that, as a practical matter, exceeds the projected annual growth
rate of the business. In such a situation, the freeze transaction will
produce no transfer tax savings benefits. For this reason, the freeze
strategy should be considered only in those rare situations where there is
a real expectation of extraordinarily large future asset appreciation that
will balloon an existing estate tax exposure. If the qualified income
interest on the preferred units retained by the parents is not properly
structured, any transfer of growth interests to the children may trigger an
unwelcome gift tax.
VI. INSIDE/OUTSIDE CHILDREN⎯AVOIDING A WAR
Transitioning a family business usually is tougher when some
children work in the business and others do not. This is a fairly common
scenario. In our case study, Earl and Betty own a business that they
worked their entire lifetimes to build. They have three children; Jeff is a
key insider, and Kathy and Paul have careers outside the business. Like
many parents in this situation, Earl and Betty view the business as an
economic investment that has become part of the family culture. Since
the business represents the bulk of their estate, they assume that each
child will eventually inherit an interest in the business.
Problems often surface in any family business owned by inside and
outside children. The problems can lead to imprudent business decisions,
costly tax consequences, and conflicts that can and often do drive a
permanent wedge into sibling relationships. The planning challenge is to
anticipate the potential conflicts, based on an honest assessment of the
specific facts, and then implement one or more strategies that may
mitigate any adverse effects. Often the best strategies are those that
eliminate the source of the conflict—joint ownership of the business.
Each child receives a fair share of the parents’ estate, but the insiders
end up with sole ownership of the family business. When this is not
possible, other strategies, often perceived as less attractive, may be used
to mitigate adverse tax and control issues triggered by the joint

251. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(4)(A).
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ownership by inside and outside children. Following is a review of the
select strategies that may be considered.
A.

The Insider Installment Sale

The insider installment sale strategy assumes that the parents, Earl
and Betty in our case, are willing to exit the business while they are
living. With this strategy, the parents sell all of the stock to the company,
a grantor trust, or the insiders and take back a long-term note. If the
company is the purchaser, the parents should have no further role in the
business.252 When the parents die, the note becomes part of their estate
and passes to all their children, along with the other assets of their estate.
Although often used, this strategy has some significant disadvantages.
The sale will trigger an income tax burden for the parents and any
children who inherit the unpaid note obligation.253 The lifetime sale
eliminates any basis step-up potential at death unless the sale is
structured to occur on or after the death of the first parent. Plus, the
purchaser (either the insiders, a trust for the insiders, or the company)
must fund the principal payments on the note with after-tax dollars, and
the parents have a wasting asset (the promissory note) that may not
sustain them, let alone provide anything for the outside children. For
these reasons and others, an insider installment sale during the life of the
parents, although preferred in select situations, often is not the solution.
Many parents prefer a strategy that will allow them to retain control and
stay in the driver’s seat, while ensuring that each child will ultimately
receive a fair share of their estate.
B.

Other Asset Equalizing

The second strategy is simple and attractive if the numbers work. The
solution is to leave the outside children assets other than the family
business. The family business stock owned by the parents passes to the
inside children, and other assets of equal value per child pass to the
outside children. Any remaining assets after this equalizing allocation
are allocated among all the children in equal shares. The result is that the
inside children receive all of the interests in the business, plus possibly
some other assets, and the outside children do not receive any stock in
252. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). See related discussion supra IV.B.
253. Any remaining payments on the note that are paid to the children will be taxed to the
children as income in respect of a decedent under I.R.C. § 691(a).
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the family business, but end up with property having a value equal to
that received by the inside children. In this situation, it is important to
carefully coordinate the provisions of the parents’ wills or living trust
with the disposition of other assets that will pass outside such
documents, such as the proceeds on life insurance policies, retirement
plan benefits, and other similar assets. These other assets must be
considered in determining equality among the children and in properly
structuring how the business interests are to be distributed to the inside
children.
There is a common obstacle to the simple strategy of giving the
business to the inside children and other assets of equal value to outside
children. In many situations, the business constitutes the bulk of the
parents’ estate. There are not enough other assets to cover the outside
children. In Earl and Betty’s situation, the business, valued at $10
million, represents more than 55 percent of their $18 million estate and
they have three children. The math does not work. In situations like this,
often the preferred solution is to provide in the parents’ wills or living
trust that the estate of the parents will be divided among the children
equally and that, in making the division, the inside children will first be
allocated equity interests in the family business. To the extent that the
value of total business equity interests owned by the estate exceeds the
value of the equity shares allocated to the inside children, the inside
children are given the option to purchase the additional business interests
from the estate, before the final distributions are made to all children.
This enables the inside children to acquire all of the equity business
interests owned by the estate, while at the same time passing an equal
date-of-death value to each child.
In creating the option, the two most critical elements are the price of
the business interests to be acquired by the inside children and the terms
of payment. The price may be set at the value finally determined for
federal estate tax purposes. If there is no federal estate tax return
required, or if the parents want a more specific basis for determining the
purchase price, they may specify a valuation formula or an appraisal
procedure, similar to what is often included in a buy-sell agreement
among co-owners. The key is to make sure that there is either a value
established or a method for determining the value so that there is little or
no basis for a dispute over price. In rare cases, the parents may choose to
name a non-child as the personal representative of the estate and allow
that “independent” personal representative to determine the price, using
whatever assistance he or she deems appropriate. In determining the
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method of payment for the option price, care should be taken to make
sure that the required cash flow payments do not jeopardize the ongoing
success of the business. For many businesses, the death of the owner
may create a significant disruption in cash flow, apart from the need to
make large cash payments to the outside children. One obvious solution
is to provide for a long-term installment payout of the price, securing the
payment obligation with the pledge of the stock being purchased. Since
the inside children will be purchasing only a portion of the equity
business interests owned by the estate, often the installment payment
method will fit within the cash flow parameters of the business.
In some cases, it may be prudent to fund the buy-out price in whole or
in part with life insurance on the parents. The inside child, Jeff in our
case, owns the policies and uses the proceeds collected on the parents’
deaths to buy the equity business interests from the estates. Often, the
inside children do not have enough surplus cash flow to fund the
premiums on the life insurance policies. So in many cases, the company
bonuses the inside children sufficient amounts to cover the premiums
and any tax hit on the bonuses. Some parents view this insider insurance
funding bonus mechanism as a deviation from the overall objective to
treat all children equally even though it ultimately provides the outside
children with cash instead of an installment note from the insiders. If the
parents share this view, the parents’ wills or living trust may be
structured to equalize such insurance bonuses among the children by
requiring that, for allocation purposes only, all bonus insurance
payments to the insiders must be added to the total estate value and be
treated as payments already credited to the inside children.
The parents may prefer to have the company itself fund the insurance
premiums, own the policy, collect the death benefit, and use the
proceeds to redeem from the estate the business interests that exceed the
equal shares of the estate allocable to the inside children. This approach
has a few significant disadvantages. It eliminates the ability of the inside
children to benefit from the stepped-up basis in the stock that would
result if they purchased the stock directly. Plus, if the company is a
sizable C corporation (annual gross receipts in excess of $7.5 million),
the company’s receipt of life insurance proceeds may trigger an
alternative minimum tax.254

254. I.R.C. §§ 55(e), 56(g).

209

DRAKE-FINAL.DOC

Washington Law Review
C.

6/10/2008 5:42:57 PM

Vol. 83:123, 2008

Real Estate and Life Insurance Trade-Offs

A partial solution to the inside-outside child dilemma may exist when
a portion of the value of the family business is real estate owned by the
parents directly. Often the parents own business-related real estate
outright or in a separate pass-through entity, such as a partnership or an
LLC. The real estate is leased to the operating business, usually a
corporation. In those situations where the value of the overall business,
including the real estate, exceeds the value of the estate shares allocable
to the inside children at the death of the parents, the preferred solution
may be to leave the outside children the business real estate and the
inside children the business. If the value of the real estate exceeds the
equal shares allocable to the outside children, a portion of the real estate
may also be allocated to the insiders so that the overall shares passing
through the estate are equal. If the value of the real estate is not
sufficient to equalize the shares (the more common scenario), this
strategy may be combined with one of the other strategies to achieve an
overall equal allocation.
When this real estate strategy is used, care needs to be taken to
mitigate conflicts that may surface between the insiders who own the
business and need use of the real estate and the outside children who
own the real estate and want to maximize its earning potential. If the real
estate is essential to the success of the business, leaving the real estate to
the outside children creates the potential for conflict. The solution is to
make sure that, at the appropriate time, the operating company enters
into a lease that secures its rights to the use of the real estate. The lease
should be for a long term and provide the company with a series of
renewal options. The lease payment obligation of the company should be
adjusted periodically to reflect a fair market rent for a long-term single
user tenant. This will help ensure that the outside children realize the
benefits of the income and value elements of the real estate that is left to
them. The lease, for example, may require that, unless the parties agree
otherwise, independent appraisers will be used every five years to adjust
the rent to reflect current market values and to set annual escalators in
the rent for the next five years. The lease should spell out the rights and
obligations typically included in commercial leases between unrelated
parties, including the parties’ respective obligations to maintain and
repair the building and to pay real estate taxes and insurance premiums.
A similar trade-off opportunity may exist if one or both of the parents
are insurable and there is no desire to hassle with the complexities of the
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other options. Life insurance may provide a solution. The parents
acquire a life insurance policy through an irrevocable trust. It may be a
second-to-die policy that pays off on the death of the surviving spouse.
The beneficiaries of the life insurance trust are the outside children. The
amount of the life insurance is based on the mix and value of the other
assets in the parents’ estate to ensure that there will be sufficient assets
to fund the tax and liquidity needs of the estate and to provide each
outside child with a benefit equal to the value of the family business
interest that will pass to each inside child.
D.

King Solomon Solution255

In select situations, the best solution to the inside-outside children
conflict may be to do what King Solomon proposed—cut the baby into
two pieces. One piece of the business goes to the inside children, who
can manage and grow it. The other piece is sold for the benefit of the
outside children. Of course, the solution has merit only in those
situations where the business can be divided into profitable pieces, one
of which can be sold. It is not a viable option for most businesses, but it
may be attractive in those situations where the business has separate
divisions or facilities, only some of which are of interest to the inside
children or, because of their size, are incapable of being purchased by
the inside children. Also, it may be the answer in those situations where
there are conflicts among different inside children who work in separate
divisions of the family business. Instead of forcing the insiders to coexist
in the same company, the company may be divided, and each insider
may be given his or her own company to manage.
In cases where a division makes sense, the tax challenge is to divide
the company into pieces without triggering a taxable event. For
partnership-taxed entities, there is seldom a problem. Corporate entities
also can make it work if the division is structured as a spin-off, split-off,
or split-up that qualifies as a tax free D reorganization.256
255. The biblical King Solomon, when faced with two women each claiming to be the mother of
a baby, proposed the ultimate solution⎯divide the baby in half. 1 Kings 3:16–28.
256. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D). If done right, the assets of a C corporation (referred to as the
“distributing corporation”) can be transferred to multiple C corporations (referred to as “controlled
corporations”), and the stock of the controlled corporations can be distributed to the shareholders of
the distributing corporation, all tax free. I.R.C. §§ 355(a), 361(a), 1032(a). Six requirements must be
satisfied: (1) A control requirement governed by I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(A) and 368(c); (2) A complete
distribution requirement governed by I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D); (3) A five-year active trade or business
requirement governed by I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3 (2007); (4) A 50 percent
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The foregoing strategies are geared at providing the outside children
with a fair share of the parents’ estate without them ever acquiring an
interest in the business. Often it is inevitable that the outside children are
going to end up owning an interest in the company on the death of the
parents. There may be insufficient other assets and insufficient cash flow
to implement a strategy that gives each child an equal share while
keeping the outsiders out of the business. Or it may be one of those
situations where the family business is an integral part of the family
culture that binds everyone, and the parents and the children want all
family members to own a part of the culture. Whatever the reason, the
parents want a strategy that will enable each child to own an interest in
the business and that will reduce or eliminate potential conflicts between
the insiders and the outsiders. The following strategies are potential
candidates in those situations.
E.

Preferred Stock Recapitalization

One option is for the parents to leave preferred stock to the outside
children and common stock to the inside children. The value of the
preferred stock often is capped so that all of the future growth in the
business shifts to the owners of the common stock⎯the inside children.
The preferred stockholders typically are given a priority right to receive
their share values on liquidation before any amounts are paid to common
stockholders (hence the name “preferred”), thus shifting all value losses
first to the common stockholders (the insiders). This shifting of the
future risk of loss to the common stock usually is regarded as an
appropriate tradeoff for also shifting the future growth to the common
stock. Generally, preferred stockholders are given a fixed cumulative
income right, although there are a wide variety of income rights that can
be granted to preferred stockholders.
One advantage of using preferred stock for the outside children is that
it reduces the potential conflict between the insiders and outsiders
regarding income distributions being structured as compensation or
dividends payments. If the insiders and outsiders both own common
stock, the outsiders will have a vested interest in dividends, while the
insiders will favor compensation payments. With preferred stock, the
dividend rights of the preferred stockholders (the outside children) are
continuity of interest requirement governed by Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(2); (5) A business purpose
requirement governed by Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2); and (6) A no dividend “device” requirement
governed by I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) and Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d).
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fixed and are not dependent on the payment of dividends on the common
stock. So the outsiders have no incentive to push for more common
stock dividends and less compensation for the insiders. In fact, as
owners of preferred stock, the outsiders may prefer the compensation
characterization for all payments to the insiders because of the tax
savings to the company. Although the outsiders’ concern over the
characterization of the insider payments is gone, the amounts paid to the
insiders, however characterized, may still be a source of conflict to the
extent there is any uncertainty regarding the company’s capacity to pay
dividends on the preferred stock, now or in the future. Excessive
compensation payments or common stock distributions to insiders in
early years may hinder the corporation’s ability to fund preferred stock
dividend payments in later years. A solution to this potential conflict
may be a shareholders’ agreement between the parties that conditions
additional payments to the insiders on the company maintaining defined
liquidity ratios (e.g. current ratio or acid-test ration) and debt-to-equity
ratios. Such ratio conditions, if fairly structured, may provide the
outsiders with comfort that the insider payments will not impair the
company’s ability to fund preferred dividends and provide the insiders
with the desired flexibility to increase their incomes free of outsider
hassles, as they grow the business.
Preferred stock can either be voting or nonvoting. If the objective is to
keep control in the hands of the insiders while the outsiders collect their
preferred dividends, nonvoting preferred may seem to be the obvious
choice. But with nonvoting preferred, the inside children have control
over whether and when preferred dividends get paid and, absent an
agreement to the contrary, their own compensation levels. Of course,
dividends on the insiders’ common stock must take a back seat to
preferred dividends to the outsiders, but this likely will be an irrelevant
concern because of the double tax hit on dividends generally and the
insiders’ capacity to set their own compensation and bonus levels.
Often there is a need for creativity in this situation. As described
above, one option is ratio requirements, contractually protected through
an agreement between all the shareholders. Another option is to make
the preferred stock nonvoting only so long as the dividends on the
preferred stock are timely paid. If the dividends ever become delinquent,
then the preferred stockholders acquire voting rights that remain forever
or until specified conditions are satisfied. This option gives the insiders a
strong incentive to always keep the preferred dividends current. But if
things get bad, the preferred stockholders have voting rights and can
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involve themselves in the challenges of the business.
With this preferred stock strategy, there are three tax issues to
consider. First, the conversion of the parents’ common stock to both
common and preferred stock should be structured to qualify as a tax-free
recapitalization.257 Second, after such a recapitalization, any gifts of
common stock to the insiders by the parents during life will be subject to
the valuation rules of section 2701.258 Generally, the value of the
preferred (determined by appraisal) will be based on its fixed dividend
rate, and the value of the common will equal the total equity less the
value of the preferred. Third, and usually of greater significance,
dividends on the preferred stock will be subject to a double tax⎯one at
the corporate level and one at the preferred shareholder level. The most
common solution to the double tax problem, the election of S
corporation status, is not available because S corporations cannot have
preferred stock.259 So although the preferred stock solution addresses
some of the conflicts of passing business interests to both inside and
outside children, it does so at a tax cost.
F.

Preferred Interests in a Limited Partnership or LLC

In select situations, a family limited partnership or family LLC may
be used to transfer preferred units to the outside children and growth
units to the inside children and avoid the double tax burdens of a C
corporation. The preferred interest for the outside children is in the form
of a preferred limited partnership or LLC interest rather than a preferred
stock interest. The preferred partnership or LLC interest can be
structured to have all of the elements of C corporation preferred stock:
capped liquidation rights; preferred liquidation rights; and fixed,
preferred income distribution rights. Also, the limited partnership or
LLC agreement may be structured to give the preferred partnership
interest holders voting rights in the event the preferred income
distributions become delinquent, just as discussed in connection with
preferred stockholders.
There are a few principal distinctions between the preferred interest
approach using a family limited partnership or LLC and the preferred
stock approach using a C corporation. The first difference is the

257. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E). See related discussion supra note 140.
258. See generally I.R.C. § 2701. See related discussion supra section IV.A.4.
259. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).
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elimination of the double tax problem. With the family partnership or
LLC, the payment of preferred partnership distributions to the outside
children does not result in double taxation because the partnership is not
a tax-paying entity. A second distinction is a negative factor that can be
neutralized with a little added complexity. When there is a family
limited partnership, the general partners have personal liability exposure
for the debts of the company. If the inside children are the general
partners, they will have personal liability exposure. One solution to this
liability problem is to have the inside children hold their general partner
interests through an S corporation. This introduces another entity into
the equation, but the added expense and complexity usually are minimal.
Another alternative is to use an LLC rather than a limited partnership.
The LLC can be structured to eliminate personal liability exposure for
all its members while spelling out the preferred and limited rights of the
outside children. A potential negative of the LLC is that the limited
rights of the outside children are a function of negotiation and
agreement. In a limited partnership, the status of being a “limited
partner” usually does the job automatically.
There is a huge obstacle, often insurmountable, to this strategy of
using a family partnership or LLC when the business has been operated
as a C corporation. That obstacle is the tax cost of converting from a C
corporation to a partnership-taxed entity. Such a conversion triggers a
tax on all built-in gains for the corporation, followed by a tax at the
shareholder level.260 The impact of these taxes often makes it
prohibitively expensive to even consider converting from a corporate
form to a partnership or LLC form.261 For this reason, the strategy is
limited to those situations where the business is already operated in a
partnership or LLC or as a sole proprietorship.
G.

S Corporation Voting and Nonvoting Stock

An S corporation may issue voting and nonvoting common stock, but
not preferred stock.262 If the family business has been operated in an S
corporation or has recently converted from C to S status, the transition
plan may be structured to have the parents transfer nonvoting common
260. I.R.C §§ 331, 336.
261. If, for example, the corporation is subject to a 34 percent marginal tax rate and the
shareholder pays a 15 percent capital gains rate, the combined tax burden on any distributed
appreciation in the liquidation will be 43.9 percent [34 + (15 x (1-34))].
262. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(1).
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stock to the outside children and voting common stock to the inside
children. Often when nonvoting stock is used, the outside children are
given limited control rights through a shareholder agreement that kicks
in under defined conditions. Usually income distributions are the biggest
challenge with this S corporation strategy. The primary advantage, of
course, is that dividends of S corporation earnings can be distributed to
both the insiders and the outsiders free of any double tax concerns. But if
the insiders have control, they will have the ability to pull out
substantially all of the earnings of the corporation, or at least a
disproportionately large amount, in the form of compensation payments.
A solution is for the parents, either during life or through their estate
plan, to impose contractual compensation limitations on the insiders.
Usually this is done with mandated employment agreements. The
insiders’ compensation under the employment agreements can be based
on a formula that provides strong incentives for the insiders to grow the
business, while ensuring that the income interests of the outsiders are
protected.
Two keys factors should be considered in the planning process
whenever equity interests are given to both the inside and outside
children. First, future value growth may be a concern of the insiders.
Depending on the nature and terms of the interest given to the outsiders,
the outsiders may have a right to participate in equity growth generated
by the business. This may dilute the insider’s incentive to grow the
business. The issue may be addressed, although usually not completely
solved, by special compensation incentives for the insiders. The inside
children may be granted stock appreciation or phantom stock deferred
compensation rights that give them a larger stake in the future growth of
the enterprise. Second, any strategy that passes ownership interests to
multiple family members should include a properly structured buy-sell
agreement to ensure that all interests are maintained within the family
and that adequate exit options exist when a family members dies,
becomes disabled, gets divorced, encounters credit problems, or wants
out.
VII. CONCLUSION
Every family business transition plan should be a custom job. Stock
solutions do not work and often will do more harm than good. The initial
driving force in the planning process should be those factors that shape
the non-tax needs and objectives of the family—the parents’ financial
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security; the expectations and aspirations of the children (both insiders
and outsiders); the retirement plans of the parents; the strength,
durability, and cash needs of the business; the relative ages, health and
life expectancies of the parents; realistic assessments of future
opportunities for value growth; the nature and scope of non-business
assets; the liquidity needs of the family; life insurance options; and all
the other concerns and desires of the particular family. Certain elements
need to be carefully evaluated in every plan, including transition timing,
the smart use of the marital deduction, entity restructuring options, and
compensation planning for those family members who make the
business their career. Care must be exercised to anticipate and avoid
various traps that can trigger unpleasant surprises and dilute the entire
planning effort.
Usually the driving tax fear is the potential impact of a large estate tax
bill on the death of the surviving parent. In select situations, a taxprotected life insurance policy owned by an irrevocable trust will
squelch the fear. But many families want or need something more than
just a funding mechanism for the ultimate tax bill; they want to
implement strategies that will meaningfully reduce the bill. Certain
strategies, particularly those that leverage the parents’ gift tax annual
exclusions and generate favorable valuation discounts, will produce
positive tax savings even if the future growth in the value of the business
is modest or nonexistent. These strategies should be given high priority
in the tax design of any plan. The tax value of other strategies, including
many of the most complicated, is predicated entirely on the extent of the
future value growth of the business. If there is no significant value
growth, the strategy may produce little or no estate tax saving, trigger
needless income and gift tax consequences, and create useless
complications for the family. Some families will want and need to
explore every available tax savings option. For many others, less will be
more. In each situation, the challenge is to carefully develop and
implement over time the best mix of tax strategies that realistically
reflect the prospects for the business, address the family’s non-tax
objectives, and conform to the family’s tolerance for complexity.
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